Abstract
Utilizing 4-digit industry data by county,we compare the allocation of resourcesacross industries in state capital areaswith noncapital areas. We are able toidentify which industries are expanded andcontracted relative to noncapital areas. Our results provide the first directevidence and measurement of the forgoneproductive activity resulting fromresources being reallocated toward rentseeking and interest group activity. Ourdata also allow us to measure total rentseeking, and also to isolate the extent ofindirect and in-kind rent seeking, whichcan account for part of the Tullockparadox.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Congleton, R. (1988). Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count. Public Choice 56: 181-184.
Ellingsen, T. (1991). Strategic buyers and the social cost of monopoly. American Economic Review 81: 648-657.
Harberger, A.C. (1954). Monopoly and resource allocation. American Economic Review 44: 77-87.
Harberger, A.C. (1959). Using the resources at hand more effectively. American Economic Review 49: 134-146.
Krueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent seeking society. American Economic Review 64: 291-303.
Laband, D.N. and Sophocleus, J.P. (1988). The social cost of rent seeking: First estimates. Public Choice 58: 269-275.
McChesney, F.S. (1987). Rent extraction and rent creation in the economic theory of regulation. The Journal of Legal Studies 16: 101-118.
Mixon, F.G. Jr. (1995). To the capitol, driver: Limousine services as a rent seeking device in sate capital cities. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Ecnomiche e Commerciali 42: 663-670.
Mixon, F.G. Jr., Laband, D.N. and Ekelund, R.B. Jr. (1994). Rent seeking and hidden in-kind resource distortion: Some empirical evidence. Public Choice 78: 171-185.
Posner, R.A. (1975). The social costs of monopoly and regulation. Journal of Political Economy 83: 807-827.
Sollars D.L. (1996). Rent seeking in state capitals, 1950-1990. Unpublished manuscript, Auburn University at Montgomery.
Tollison, R.D. (1982). Rent seeking: A survey. Kyklos 35: 575-602.
Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare cost of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal 5: 224-232.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent seeking society, 97-112. College Station: Texas A&M Press.
Tullock, G. (1989). The economics of special privilege and rent seeking. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tullock, G. (1993). Rent seeking. Hants, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
Tullock, G. (1997). Where is the rectangle? Public Choice 91: 149-159.
Tullock, G. (1998). Which rectangle? Public Choice 96: 405-410.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sobel, R.S., Garrett, T.A. On the Measurement of Rent Seeking and its Social Opportunity Cost. Public Choice 112, 115–136 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015666307423
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015666307423