Adequate Moods for noneu Decision Making in a Sequential Framework
 Nathalie Etchart
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In a dynamic (sequential) framework, departures from the independence axiom (IND) are reputed to induce violations of dynamic consistency (DC), which may in turn have undesirable normative consequences. This result thus questions the normative acceptability of non expectedutility (nonEU) models, which precisely relax IND. This paper pursues a twofold objective. The main one is to discuss the normative conclusion: usual arguments linking violations of DC to departures from IND are shown to be actually based on specific (but usually remaining implicit) assumptions which may rightfully be released, so that it is actually possible for a nonEU maximizer to be dynamically consistent and thus avoid normative difficulties. The second objective is to introduce a kind of `reality principle' (through two other evaluation criteria) in order to mitigate the normative requirement when examining adequate moods for nonEU decision making.
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 Title
 Adequate Moods for noneu Decision Making in a Sequential Framework
 Journal

Theory and Decision
Volume 52, Issue 1 , pp 128
 Cover Date
 20020201
 DOI
 10.1023/A:1015503119317
 Print ISSN
 00405833
 Online ISSN
 15737187
 Publisher
 Kluwer Academic Publishers
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Keywords

 Sequential decisions
 Decision trees
 Dynamic consistency
 Nonexpected utility
 Myopia
 Money pump
 Consequentialism
 Sophisticated behaviour
 Behavioural consistency
 Resolute behaviour
 Industry Sectors
 Authors

 Nathalie Etchart ^{(1)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Department of Economics and Management, GRID, Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, 61, Avenue du Président Wilson, 94235, CACHAN Cedex, France