Are Referees Sufficiently Informed About The Editor'S Practice? Authors
Cite this article as: Ben-Yashar, R. & Nitzan, S. Theory and Decision (2001) 51: 1. doi:10.1023/A:1012273830440 Abstract
This paper clarifies why editors of academic journals should share with their referees the information about the number of referees they consult and the decision rule they apply. Our analysis also rationalizes the common questionable phenomenon of editors who seem to distort the yes or no recommendations of their referees. The editors request a recommendation of whether to accept or reject the paper as well as an assessment of the paper. The editors need the complete reports to make the appropriate correction of the referees' final recommendations.
Referees Editors Decision-making system Information sharing Endogenous acceptance criteria REFERENCES
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