Minds and Machines

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 577–595

Real Logic is Nonmonotonic


  • Henry E. KyburgJr.
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Rochester and The Institute for Human and Machine Intelligence

DOI: 10.1023/A:1011808015672

Cite this article as:
Kyburg, H.E. Minds and Machines (2001) 11: 577. doi:10.1023/A:1011808015672


Charles Morgan has argued that nonmonotonic logic is ``impossible''. We show here that those arguments are mistaken, and that Morgan's preferred alternative, the representation of nonmonotonic reasoning by ``presuppositions'' fails to provide a framework in which nonmonotonic reasoning can be constructively criticised. We argue that an inductive logic, based on probabilistic acceptance, offers more than Morgan's approach through presuppositions.

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© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001