Instability and Convergence Under Simple-Majority Rule: Results from Simulation of Committee Choice in Two-Dimensional Space
- David H. Koehler
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Nondeterministic models of collective choice posit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. The object of this research is to estimate the extent of convergence of majority choice under different procedural conditions. The paper reports results from a computer simulation of simple-majority decision making by committees. Simulation experiments generate distributions of majority-adopted proposals in two-dimensional space. These represent nondeterministic outcomes of majority choice by committees. The proposal distributions provide data for a quantitative evaluation of committee-choice procedures in respect to outcome convergence. Experiments were run under general conditions, and under conditions that restrict committee choice to several game-theoretic solution sets. The findings are that, compared to distributions of voter ideal points, majority-adopted proposals confined to the solution sets demonstrate different degrees of convergence. Second, endogenous agenda formation is a more important obstacle to convergence than the inherent instability of simple-majority rule. Third, if members maximize preferences in respect to agenda formation, a committee choice that approximates the central tendency of the distribution of voter preferences is unlikely. The conclusion is that the most effective way to increase the convergence of majority choice is to restrict the role of individual preferences in agenda formation: identification of proposals to be voted up or down by a committee.
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- Instability and Convergence Under Simple-Majority Rule: Results from Simulation of Committee Choice in Two-Dimensional Space
Theory and Decision
Volume 50, Issue 4 , pp 305-332
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Additional Links
- majority rule
- spatial voting models
- computer simulation
- rational choice
- committee choice convergence
- Industry Sectors
- David H. Koehler (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. David H. Koehler, Department of Public Administration, School of Public Affairs, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20016, USA