Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?
- Gary EbbsAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, University of Illinois
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In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe aweird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning endsup with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certainsentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that wereject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt onethat better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.
- Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?
Volume 105, Issue 1 , pp 43-58
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- Gary Ebbs (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, 61801-3611, USA