Philosophical Studies

, Volume 105, Issue 1, pp 43–58

Is Skepticism about Self-Knowledge Coherent?

Authors

  • Gary Ebbs
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Illinois
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1010374710610

Cite this article as:
Ebbs, G. Philosophical Studies (2001) 105: 43. doi:10.1023/A:1010374710610

Abstract

In previous work I argued that skepticism about the compatibility ofanti-individualism with self-knowledge is incoherent. Anthony Brueckner isnot convinced by my argument, for reasons he has recently explained inprint. One premise in Brueckner's reasoning is that a person'sself-knowledge is confined to what she can derive solely from herfirst-person experiences of using her sentences. I argue that Brueckner'sacceptance of this premise undermines another part of his reasoning – hisattempt to justify his claims about what thoughts our sincere utterances ofcertain sentences would express in various possible worlds. I describe aweird possible world in which a person who uses Brueckner's reasoning endsup with false beliefs about what thoughts her sincere utterances of certainsentences would express in various possible worlds. I recommend that wereject Brueckner's problematic conception of self-knowledge, and adopt onethat better fits the way we actually ascribe self-knowledge.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001