Theory and Decision

, Volume 50, Issue 4, pp 383–395

Constrained Monotonicity and the Measurement of Power

Authors

  • Manfred J. Holler
    • Institute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of Hamburg
  • Rie Ono
    • Institute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of Hamburg
  • Frank Steffen
    • Institute of SocioEconomicsUniversity of Hamburg
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1010335410952

Cite this article as:
Holler, M.J., Ono, R. & Steffen, F. Theory and Decision (2001) 50: 383. doi:10.1023/A:1010335410952

Abstract

In this paper we will discuss constraints on the number of (non-dummy) players and on the distribution of votes such that local monotonicity is satisfied for the Public Good Index. These results are compared to properties which are related to constraints on the redistribution of votes (such as implied by global monotonicity). The discussion shows that monotonicity is not a straightforward criterion of classification for power measures.

Voting Power Indices Public Good Index Local Monotonocity Player-Constrained Local Monotonicity Partial Local Monotonicity

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2001