Journal of Logic, Language and Information

, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 369–388

An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic

  • Joeri Engelfriet
  • Jan Treur
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1008243611454

Cite this article as:
Engelfriet, J. & Treur, J. Journal of Logic, Language and Information (1998) 7: 369. doi:10.1023/A:1008243611454

Abstract

When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a semantics for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours.

Nonmonotonic reasoningdefault logictemporal logicepistemic logicpreferential entailment

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joeri Engelfriet
    • 1
  • Jan Treur
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence GroupVrije Universiteit AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands