An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic
- Cite this article as:
- Engelfriet, J. & Treur, J. Journal of Logic, Language and Information (1998) 7: 369. doi:10.1023/A:1008243611454
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When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a semantics for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours.