The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception
- Sanford C. Goldberg
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Do computers have beliefs? I argue that anyone who answers in the affirmative holds a view that is incompatible with what I shall call the commonsense approach to the propositional attitudes. My claims shall be two. First,the commonsense view places important constraints on what can be acknowledged as a case of having a belief. Second, computers – at least those for which having a belief would be conceived as having a sentence in a belief box – fail to satisfy some of these constraints. This second claim can best be brought out in the context of an examination of the idea of computer self-knowledge and self-deception, but the conclusion is perfectly general: the idea that computers are believers, like the idea that computers could have self-knowledge or be self-deceived, is incompatible with the commonsense view. The significance of the argument lies in the choice it forces on us: whether to revise our notion of belief so as to accommodate the claim that computers are believers, or to give up on that claim so as to preserve our pretheoretic notion of the attitudes. We cannot have it both ways.
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- The Very Idea of Computer Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception
Minds and Machines
Volume 7, Issue 4 , pp 515-529
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- Kluwer Academic Publishers
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, Grinnell, IA, 50112, USA