Erkenntnis

, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp 253–279

Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism

  • Stathis Psillos
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005589117656

Cite this article as:
Psillos, S. Erkenntnis (2000) 52: 253. doi:10.1023/A:1005589117656

Abstract

Based on archival material from the Carnap and FeiglArchives, this paper re-examines Carnap's approach tothe issue of scientific realism in the 1950s and theearly 1960s. It focuses on Carnap's re-invention ofthe Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theoriesand argues that Carnap wanted to entertain a genuineneutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate.Following Grover Maxwell, it claims that Carnap'sposition may be best understood as a version of`structural realism'. However, thus understood,Carnap's position faces the challenge that Newmanraised against Russell's structuralism: the claim thatthe knowledge of the unobservable is limited to itspurely structural characteristics is eitheruninformative or unsustainable.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stathis Psillos
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and History of ScienceUniversity of AthensAthensGreece