, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp 239–252

Extensions As Representative Objects In Frege's Logic

  • M. Ruffino

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005542812275

Cite this article as:
Ruffino, M. Erkenntnis (2000) 52: 239. doi:10.1023/A:1005542812275


Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue that the assumption that `the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Ruffino
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFederal UniversityRio De Janeiro, R.JBrazil