THE UNDERDETERMINATION/INDETERMINACY DISTINCTION AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION
- Cite this article as:
- Moore, A.W. Erkenntnis (1997) 46: 5. doi:10.1023/A:1005382611551
- 76 Downloads
Two of W. V. Quine's most familiar doctrines are his endorsement of the distinction between underdetermination and indeterminacy, and his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. The author argues that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine, and based on the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, the author draws an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of true sentences, and then argues that this corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. In an appendix the author expands on one aspect of the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and discusses, in passing, some of Quine's more general views on truth.