Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings Authors
Cite this article as: Denicolò, V. & Mariotti, M. Theory and Decision (2000) 48: 351. doi:10.1023/A:1005278100070
In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.
Social Welfare Orderings
Conley, J. and Wilkie, S. (1996), The bargaining problem without convexity: Extending the Nash solution,
Games and Economic Behavior 13: 26–38.
d'Aspremont, C. (1985), Axioms for social welfare orderings, in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein (eds.),
Social Goals and Social Organization, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Herrero, M.J. (1989), The Nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems,
Journal of Economic Theory 49: 266–277.
Kaneko, M. (1980), An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function,
Theory and Decision 12: 135–148.
Mariotti, M. (1998a), Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite,
Social Choice and Welfare 15: 413–421.
Mariotti, M. (1998b), Extending Nash's axioms to non-convex problems,
Games and Economic Behavior 22: 377–383.
Moulin, H. (1988),
Axioms for Cooperative Decision Making, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Nash, J. (1950), The bargaining problem,
Econometrica 18: 155–162.
Roth, A. (1977), Individual rationality and Nash's solution to the bargaining problem,
Mathematics of Operations Research 2: 64–65.
Zhou, L. (1997), The Nash bargaining theory with non-convex problems,
Econometrica 65: 681–686. Copyright information
© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000