Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings Authors
Cite this article as: Denicolò, V. & Mariotti, M. Theory and Decision (2000) 48: 351. doi:10.1023/A:1005278100070 Abstract
In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.
Bargaining Nash solution Nonconvex problems Social Welfare Orderings REFERENCES
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