, Volume 121, Issue 3, pp 291–307

Necessity, The A Priori, And The Standard Meter

  • Eric Loomis

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005229326821

Cite this article as:
Loomis, E. Synthese (1999) 121: 291. doi:10.1023/A:1005229326821


This article critically examines SaulKripke's (1972) argument for the separability ofnecessary truths from truths known a priori,focusing on his criticism of the standard meter casepresented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to showthat Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of severalreadings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalistaccount of necessary truth is then considered in thelight of the standard meter example.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eric Loomis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Texas at AustinAustinU.S.A.