The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge
- Sanford C. Goldberg
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In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), will suffice as an acceptable answer to the psychological question. My general ambition is thus to establish that more work is needed if we are to have a full account of self-knowledge in both its epistemological and psychological aspects. I conclude by suggesting how my thesis bears on those who aim to provide an empirical account of the cognition involved in self-knowledge.
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- The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge
Volume 118, Issue 2 , pp 165-199
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- 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, 1427 Paterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY, 40506-0027