Public Choice

, Volume 102, Issue 3, pp 247–269

Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union

  • Roel M.W.J. Beetsma
  • A. Lans Bovenberg

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005016001877

Cite this article as:
Beetsma, R.M. & Bovenberg, A.L. Public Choice (2000) 102: 247. doi:10.1023/A:1005016001877


This paper explores the conditions under which aEuropean Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currencyarea. The scope for an EMU increases with theconvergence of structural and fiscal policies, smallmoney holdings, a conservative European Central Bank,and dependent national central banks. How nationalpolicies affect the rest of the union once the EMU hasbeen established is also investigated. The case forsurveillance of national structural and fiscalpolicies appears to depend mainly on the monetaryarrangements in the union.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roel M.W.J. Beetsma
    • 1
  • A. Lans Bovenberg
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Center for Economic ResearchTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands