Theory and Decision

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 57–72

The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Authors

  • Robert Hoffmann
    • The University of Nottingham Business School, University Park
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005008122139

Cite this article as:
Hoffmann, R. Theory and Decision (1999) 47: 57. doi:10.1023/A:1005008122139

Abstract

The results of a series of computer simulations demonstrate how the introduction of separate spatial dimensions for agent interaction and learning respectively affects the possibility of cooperation evolving in the repeated prisoner's dilemma played by populations of boundedly-rational agents. In particular, the localisation of learning promotes the emergence of cooperative behaviour, while the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it.

LocalisationRepeated prisoner's dilemmaCellular automataGenetic algorithm

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999