Abstract
The results of a series of computer simulations demonstrate how the introduction of separate spatial dimensions for agent interaction and learning respectively affects the possibility of cooperation evolving in the repeated prisoner's dilemma played by populations of boundedly-rational agents. In particular, the localisation of learning promotes the emergence of cooperative behaviour, while the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it.
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Hoffmann, R. The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 47, 57–72 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005008122139
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005008122139