Theory and Decision

, Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 57–72

The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

  • Robert Hoffmann
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005008122139

Cite this article as:
Hoffmann, R. Theory and Decision (1999) 47: 57. doi:10.1023/A:1005008122139

Abstract

The results of a series of computer simulations demonstrate how the introduction of separate spatial dimensions for agent interaction and learning respectively affects the possibility of cooperation evolving in the repeated prisoner's dilemma played by populations of boundedly-rational agents. In particular, the localisation of learning promotes the emergence of cooperative behaviour, while the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it.

Localisation Repeated prisoner's dilemma Cellular automata Genetic algorithm 

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert Hoffmann
    • 1
  1. 1.The University of Nottingham Business School, University ParkNottinghamUK. Phone

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