Boyd, R. (1988): ‘How to be a Moral Realist’, in G. Sayre McCord (ed.), Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Boyd, R. (1989): ‘What Realism Implies and What It Does Not’, Dialectica.
Boyd, R. (1990a): ‘Realism, Approximate Truth and Philosophical Method’, in Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Boyd, R. (1990b): ‘Realism, Conventionality, and ‘Realism About’ ’, in Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R. (1991): ‘Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds’, Philosophical Studies 61, 127–148.
Boyd, R. (1992): ‘Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method’, in John Earman (ed.), Inference, Explanation and Other Philosophical Frustrations.
Boyd, R. (1993): ‘Metaphor and Theory Change’ (second version), in A. Ortony (ed.), Metaphor and Thought, 2nd Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Boyd, R. (forthcoming): ‘Kinds as the “Workmanship of Men”: Realism, Constructivism, and Natural Kinds’, Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. de Gruyter.
Guyot, K. (1987): What, If Anything, is a Higher Taxon? Ph.D thesis Cornell University.
Mayr, E. (1988): Towards a New Philosophy of Biology, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.