Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 1–28

Tarski on “essentially richer” metalanguages

Authors

  • David DeVidi
    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Waterloo
  • Graham Solomon
    • Department of PhilosophyWilfrid Laurier University
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1004294325183

Cite this article as:
DeVidi, D. & Solomon, G. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1999) 28: 1. doi:10.1023/A:1004294325183

Abstract

It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that it is necessary and sufficient that the metalanguage be “essentially richer”. Our contention, put bluntly, is that this claim deserves more scrutiny from philosophers than it usually gets and in fact is false unless “essentially richer” means nothing else than “sufficient to contain a truth definition for the object language.”

truth definitionsT-schemematerial adequacyhierarchiesconsistency

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999