Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 26, Issue 5, pp 477–500

A Theory of Truth that Prefers Falsehood

  • Melvin Fitting
Article

DOI: 10.1023/A:1004217812355

Cite this article as:
Fitting, M. Journal of Philosophical Logic (1997) 26: 477. doi:10.1023/A:1004217812355

Abstract

We introduce a subclass of Kripke's fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also be studied. The notion of intrinsic is shown to relativize to these two subclasses. The mathematical ideas presented here originated in investigations of so-called stable models in the semantics of logic programming.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Melvin Fitting
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. Mathematics and Computer ScienceLehman College (CUNY)Bronx
  2. 2.Depts. Computer Science, Philosophy, MathematicsGraduate Center (CUNY)NYC