Abstract
We focus on the recent non-causal theory of reasons explanationsof free action proffered by a proponent of the agency theory, Timothy O'Connor. We argue that the conditions O'Connor offersare neither necessary nor sufficient for a person to act for a reason. Finally, we note that the role O'Connor assigns toreasons in the etiology of actions results in further conceptual difficulties for agent-causalism.
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Feldman, R., Buckareff, A.A. Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency. Philosophical Studies 112, 135–145 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022542004219
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022542004219