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Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality

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Abstract

The methodological ideal of experimentalists, E, is easily stated: derive a testable hypothesis, H, from a well-specified theory, T; implement experiments with a design; implicitly in the latter are auxiliary hypotheses, A, that surface in the review/discussion of completed research reports (payoffs are 'adequate,' Ss are 'relevant,' instructions, context are 'clear,' etc.). We want to be able to conclude, if statistical test outcomes support not-H, that T is 'falsified.' But this is not what we do; rather we ask if there is a flaw in the test, i.e. not-A is supported, and we do more experiments. This is good practice—much better than the statistical rhetoric of falsificationism. Undesigned social processes allow E to accumulate technical and instrumental knowledge that drive the reduction of experimental error and constitute a more coherent methodology than falsificationism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, Truland Building 400-J, 3330 Washington blvd, Arlington, Virginia

    Vernon L. Smith (Professor of Economics and Law)

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  1. Vernon L. Smith
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Smith, V.L. Method in Experiment: Rhetoric and Reality. Experimental Economics 5, 91–110 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020330820698

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