Abstract
The 1991 decision of the European Commission on the Tetra Pak case was based on information which seemed to prove the firm's anti-competitive behavior. The Tetra Pak case is investigated here focusing on the meaning of multimarket dominance, using empirical techniques. We find that a more rigorous analysis of the data available would not confirm the Commission's assertions. That is, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the Commission was right to relate Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector to its market power in the non-aseptic sector. Our results suggest a general framework for the analysis of abusive transfer of market power across vertically or/and horizontally related markets.
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GARCIA-GALLEGO, A., GEORGANTZIS, N. Dominance in the Tetra Pak Case: An Empirical Approach. European Journal of Law and Economics 7, 137–161 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008657326185
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008657326185