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Multiple Realization, Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States

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Abstract

The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.

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Shagrir, O. Multiple Realization, Computation and the Taxonomy of Psychological States. Synthese 114, 445–461 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005072701509

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