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Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool

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Abstract

In this largely instrumental thought experiment I make the case for exploring the potential of Article 259 TFEU, allowing for direct actions brought by the member states of the European Union against other member states in the context of the enforcement of the rule of law in the member states deviating from the principles of Article 2 TEU. Deploying this proposal will imply changing the established practice of (non-)application of Article 259 TFEU. Such a change, while not departing from the letter or the spirit of the law, has several advantages, from not getting the Commission directly involved in the action about the values of Article 2 TEU (should it wish to keep on staying away), to avoiding the unhelpful construction of Article 258 TFEU, which has been interpreted too cautiously and emerged as unhelpful in the context of rule of law enforcement and entirely unused in the context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights violations. Change should start somewhere and the member states, using Article 259 TFEU potentially could take the lead. In making the plea for paying more attention to horizontal enforcement of values among the member states (albeit via the Court of Justice) this contribution draws on the helpful analysis of the possibility of bundling evidence of member state disregard of the rule of law to start ‘systemic infringement actions’ before the Court of Justice. This technique, proposed by Kim Lane Scheppele, could make a difference in the world of enforcement of the promise of compliance with the very basics contained in Article 2 TEU.

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Notes

  1. For a normative analysis of the context necessitating intervention, see e.g. von Bogdandy and Ioannidis, p. 59; Closa (2016a).

  2. For a brief overview, see Closa et al. (2014). For a more in-depth approach, see the contributions in Closa and Kochenov (2015), Jakab and Kochenov (2016).

  3. For comparative analyses, see e.g. Closa et al. (2014), Kochenov (2014, p. 145).

  4. Council of the EU, press release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 20–21; Hirsch Ballin (2016).

  5. European Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’, Strasbourg, 11 March 2014, COM(2014)158 final. For an analysis, see Kochenov and Pech (2015). See also, crucially, Scheppele (2016) (outlining how to empower the Commission to intervene in the cases related to the breach of Article 2 TEU based on a so-called ‘systemic infringement procedure’, allowing for a more effective deployment of Article 258 TFEU).

  6. Toggenburg and Grimheden (2016).

  7. Müller (2014, p. 141), Müller (2015).

  8. Tuori (2016), Nergelius (2015).

  9. von Bogdandy et al. (2012, p. 489. For analyses, see Croon-Gestefeld (2016), Kochenov (2014). See also an upgraded versions of this proposal: von Bogdandy et al. (2015), von Bogdandy et al. (2016).

  10. Jakab (2016). The Charter’s potential is as far-reaching as it is unused: Hoffmeister (2015), Łazowski (2013, p. 573). See also Eeckhout (2002, p. 945).

  11. See most importantly, Smith (2015, p. 350), Lenaerts et al. ((2013, pp. 159–213), Materne (2012), Prete and Smulders (2010, p. 9. See also Łazowski (2013), Baratta (2010, p. 115). For a compelling account of the enforcement of EU law as it stands, see Cremona (2012).

  12. Article 259(1) TFEU.

  13. Article 259(2) TFEU.

  14. Article 7 TEU, in particular, comes to mind in this context: Sadurski (2010, p. 385), Bugarič (2016), Besselink (2016).

  15. See the letter of 6 March 2013 sent by four Foreign Affairs Ministers to the President of the Commission, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/brieven/2013/03/13/brief-aan-europese-commissie-over-opzetten-rechtsstatelijkheidsmechanisme. The crucial thing to understand about such letters is that all Member States are always invited, through their foreign ministers, to sign. That only four ministers ultimately signed thus means that 24 others do not consider extending the EU’s capacity for action in the domain of values either timely or necessary.

  16. So the Latvian presidency refused to attend a European Parliament debate on the state of the rule of law in Hungary in May 2015. See Politics.hu, ‘European Liberals Condemn Latvian EU Presidency for Shunning Debate on Hungary’, www.politics.hu/20150519/european-liberals-condemn-latvian-eu-presidency-for-shunning-debate-on-hungary/. Accessed 11 November 2015. Interestingly, Hungary held the presidency of the EU when the problematic constitutional perturbations happened. On the story of the Hungarian ‘reforms’, see Sólyom (2015), Bánkuti et al. (2012, p. 138). See also Uitz (2015, p. 279).

  17. Only a handful of cases have been brought based on Article 259 TFEU, most of them highly controversial: e.g. Case 141/78 France v. UK [1979] ECR 2923; Case C-388/95 Belgium v. Spain [2000] ECR I-3123; Case C-145/04 Spain v. UK [2006] ECR I-7917; C-364/10 Hungary v. Slovakia [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:630.

  18. See, most importantly, Lenaerts et al. (2013).

  19. On the general need to apply comparative arguments in the context of the enforcement of the Rule of Law and other values by regional organisations, see the impressive overview by Carlos Closa, including precise mechanics of action under the law of each of the regional organisations: Closa (2016b).

  20. A handful of inter-state cases have been brought before the ECtHR. The full list is as follows: Greece v. UK (I and II) (Appl. Nos. 176/56 and 299/57); Austria v. Italy (Appl. No. 788/60); Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (I and II) (Appl. Nos. 3321–3323/67, 3344/67 and 4448/70); Ireland v. UK (I and II) (Appl. Nos. 5310/71 and 5451/72); Cyprus v. Turkey (I, II and III) (Appl. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75 and 8007/77); Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey (Appl. Nos. 9940–9944/82); Cyprus v. Turkey (IV) (Appl. No. 25781/94); Denmark v. Turkey (Appl. No. 34382/97); Georgia v. Russia (I, II and III) (Appl. Nos. 13255/07, 38263/08 and 61186/09) Ukraine v. Russia (I and II) (Appl. Nos. 20958/14 and 43800/14). The absolute majority of these cases relate to open conflicts between states. For a critical appraisal, see Browning (2010). For an analysis which approaches the ECHR procedure in the context of other international inter-state actions, see e.g., Leckie (1988, pp. 271–276).

  21. Closa (2016a).

  22. For a detailed distinction between the acquis and the values of democracy and the rule of law now reflected in Article 2 TEU, please consult Kochenov (2008) (on the pre-accession context) and Kochenov (2015b).

  23. See, for a general analysis, Kochenov (2015c).

  24. Scheppele (2016).

  25. Closa and Kochenov (2016).

  26. Klamert (2014). See also Hillion (2016).

  27. See the analysis below.

  28. Scheppele (2016). See also Craig and de Búrca (2015, pp. 431–453).

  29. For a great overview of the law as it stands, see, Lenaerts et al. (2013); Gormley (2016). For a clear selection of the most relevant cases, see Scheppele (2016).

  30. Wennerås (2016).

  31. Closa (2016a), Müller (2014, 2015).

  32. J. Cornides, ‘The European Union: Rule of Law or Rule of Judges?’, EJIL Analysis (blog), www.ejiltalk.org/the-european-union-rule-of-law-or-rule-of-judges/. Accessed 12 November 2015.

  33. Weiler (2016).

  34. Palombella (2016); Kochenov (2015a).

  35. Kochenov (2015a).

  36. Even if I actually agree with Christophe Hillion’s opinion that some of the criticism of Article 2 TEU-based actions is legally unsound, as the article clearly boasts clear legal value and was meant to be enforced, to which the very existence of the Article 7 TEU procedure abundantly testifies: Hillion (2016).

  37. Bringing a case based on an allegation of inaction is of course not an option in such cases, as the Commission enjoys full discretion under Article 258 TFEU: Case 247/87 Star Fruit v. Commission [1989] ECR 291 ECLI:EU:C:1989:58. Compare Prete and Smulders (2010, pp. 13–15).

  38. To the best of my knowledge, not a single one of the key proposals related to the mechanics of the enforcement of EU values was related to the use of Article 259 TFEU to this end.

  39. On this essential distinction, see e.g., Kochenov (2015b).

  40. C-364/10 Hungary v. Slovakia [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:630.

  41. Annotated by Rossi (2013, p. 1451).

  42. Araiza (2015), Kochenov (2015c).

  43. For the particular effects of EU citizenship on the nationalities of the member states showcasing the key processes of importance in the Slovak context, see Kochenov (2012).

  44. Spiro (2010, p. 111). See also, Kochenov (2011, p. 323) (providing an EU law perspective).

  45. Kochenov (2015c), Araiza (2015).

  46. Case C-145/04 Spain v. UK [2006] ECR I-7917.

  47. For a general discussion in the context of EU law, see Khachaturyan (2015). The facts of Spain v. UK are obscure and atypical enough to be fascinating and concerned a claim of violation of EU law through the undue unilateral amendment of an ad hoc sui generis acquis instrument by the UK in order to ensure compliance with an ECtHR judgment. See the annotation by Besselink (2008, p. 787).

  48. Matthews v. U.K. (Appl. No. 24833/94). King (2000, p. 79), de Schutter and L’Hoest (2000, p. 141).

  49. For a detailed discussion, see Fabbrini (2016).

  50. On the unnecessary connection between political rights and nationality, see Lardy (1997, pp. 97–98).

  51. Azopardi (2009); Khachaturyan (2015).

  52. It is conceded that this is a somewhat atypical use of the term. For the general state of the art, see Saydé (2014).

  53. This is the case since Article 259—just like Article 258 TFEU—is not intended to protect the claimants’ rights. Rather, the provisions aim to ensure general compliance with EU law: e.g. Case C-431/92 Commission v. Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, para. 21. Compare Prete and Smulders (2010, p. 13); Gormley (2016).

  54. E.g. Opinion of AG Tizzano in Joined Cases C-466 and 476/98 Commission v. UK et al. [2002] ECR I-9741, para. 30. Compare Prete and Smulders (2010, p. 14).

  55. Schütze (2009), Kochenov (2016).

  56. Łazowski (2013).

  57. This is what happened with the judicial retirement and the data protection cases involving Hungary: C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:687; Case C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237. While the Commission won on paper, the victory was clearly a Pyrrhic one, as it failed to drive compliance with the fundamental values of Article 2 TEU. For a detailed explanation see Scheppele (2016); Belavusau (2013, p. 1145). For a somewhat more positive assessment of the Commission v. Hungary cases, see an analysis by a lawyer who serves on the Commission: Hoffmeister (2015).

  58. Łazowski (2013, pp. 583–586). Indeed, that the Charter could and should be used there is no doubt: Hoffmeister (2015).

  59. The ECJ clarified that the Commission is obliged by law to discuss the issue of bringing infringement proceedings at the meetings of the college. See Prete and Smulders (2010, p. 29), with abundant references to case law.

  60. On the enforcement of EU law through the use of the preliminary ruling procedure, see Broberg (2016).

  61. Case C-387/02 Berlusconi and others [2005] ECR I-3565, paras. 68–69: Hoffmeister (2015, pp. 206–208).

  62. For a broad analysis of this context, see e.g., Müller (2013).

  63. Müller (2015), von Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014). For an overview, see, Closa and Kochenov (2016).

  64. Hillion (2016).

  65. E.g. Sadurski (2010).

  66. Scheppele (2016). See also Scheppele (2014).

  67. Joined Cases 90&91/63 Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium [1964] ECR 625. For an analysis, see Phelan (2014). This prohibition effectively bars member states from deploying ‘horizontal Solange’ logic against each other. On ‘horizontal Solange’, see I. Canor (2013, p. 384).

  68. For an analysis of the Commission’s and the Council’s proposed solutions, see Kochenov and Pech (2015).

  69. Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:687; Case C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.

  70. See Altwicker (2015). The Union constitutional system fully recognises this by accepting the ECHR rules among its sources of inspiration, in addition to the obligation on the Union to join the Convention.

  71. Garnering large numbers of initiating member states is actually absolutely unnecessary, as all the member states would be able to submit observations anyway, once the case reaches the Court.

  72. Editorial Comments (2015, p. 619), Hillion (2016).

  73. Canor (2013).

  74. Toggenburg (2001, p. 735), Lachmayer (2016).

  75. Piris (2010, p. 71). See for a detailed analysis, Hillion (2016).

  76. See, most recently, Opinion 2/13 (ECHR Accession II) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 192.

  77. Kochenov (2015a).

  78. Maresceau (2006, p. 69).

  79. Kochenov (2008).

  80. Smith (2015, p. 351).

  81. Kochenov (2015b).

  82. Scheppele (2016).

  83. We could fear that the second case it is reported to have ‘won’ against Hungary is no different at all: Case C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237. See also Scheppele (2014).

  84. Hoffmeister (2015, pp. 206–208).

  85. Sólyom (2015).

  86. Polyák (2015).

  87. Łazowski (2013).

  88. E.g. Gormley (2005, p. 655).

  89. Smith (2015, p. 352).

  90. Scheppele (2016). Her proposal has been analyzed in the Verfassungsblog in great detail. For the details of the proposal, see, K.L. Scheppele, ‘What Can the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic Principles of the European Union? The Case for Systematic Infringement Actions’, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/assises-justice-2013/files/contributions/45.princetonuniversityscheppelesystemicinfringementactionbrusselsversion_en.pdf. Accessed 12 November 2015; for the proposal in brief, see, K.L. Scheppele, ‘EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case for the “Systemic Infringement Action”’, Verfassungsblog, http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/author/kim-lane-scheppele/. For the discussion, see, Verfassungsblog, ‘Hungary—Taking Action, Episode 2: The Systemic Infringement Action’, available online at http://www.verfassungsblog.de/en/author/kim-lane-scheppele/.

  91. Smith (2015, p. 353).

  92. ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.’.

  93. E.g. Case C-494/01 Commission v. Ireland (Irish Waste) [2005] ECR I-3331.

  94. Scheppele (2016).

  95. Scheppele (2016).

  96. For a more detailed assessment and criticism of this proposal, see Verfassungsblog, ‘Hungary—Taking Action, Episode 2: The Systemic Infringement Action’, www.verfassungsblog.de/en/category/focus/ungarn-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-scheppele/#.Uw4m4Puzm5J. Closa and Kochenov (2016), Kochenov (2014).

  97. Wennerås (2016), Smith (2015), Jack (2013, p. 420), Wennerås (2012, p. 145), Smith (2010, p. 547).

  98. Wennerås (2016).

  99. Closa (2016a). See also Closa and Kochenov (2016).

  100. Klabbers (1999).

  101. Kochenov (2015a).

  102. As demonstrated in Case 141/78 France v. UK [1979] ECR 2923 and accepted in the literature. For an overview, see e.g., Prete and Smulders (2010, p. 27) (and the references cited therein).

  103. For an analysis see Lenaerts et al. (2013), Prete and Smulders (2010), Łazowski (2013).

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Acknowledgments

Early versions of this work were presented at a seminar at the European Parliament and at conferences in Paris and Tilburg. I wish to thank István Hegedűs, Turkuler Isiksel and Maurice Adams for the kind invitations and Kim Lane Scheppele and Panos Koutrakos and the three anonymous reviewers for indispensable comments. Assistance of Elena Basheska and Harry Panagoloulos is kindly acknowledged.

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  1. Visiting Professor and Martin and Kathleen Crane Fellow in Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, USA

    Dimitry Kochenov

  2. Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Natolin, Poland

    Dimitry Kochenov

  3. Professor of EU Constitutional Law, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Dimitry Kochenov

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Kochenov, D. Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool. Hague J Rule Law 7, 153–174 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-015-0019-1

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