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Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems

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An Erratum to this article was published on 11 January 2012

Abstract

Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by Strenzke et al. (Side channels in the McEliece PKC, vol. 5299, pp. 216–229, 2008), and novel countermeasures against such attack.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Qualcomm CDMA Technologies GmbH, Munich, Germany

    Roberto Avanzi & Simon Hoerder

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Simon Hoerder, Dan Page & Michael Tunstall

Authors
  1. Roberto Avanzi
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  2. Simon Hoerder
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  3. Dan Page
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  4. Michael Tunstall
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Roberto Avanzi.

Additional information

The research described in this paper was conducted while the first author was a member of the Faculty of Mathematics, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany. This work has been supported in part by EPSRC grants EP/H001689/1 and EP/F039638/1.

An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13389-011-0026-7

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Avanzi, R., Hoerder, S., Page, D. et al. Side-channel attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems. J Cryptogr Eng 1, 271–281 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-011-0024-9

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