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The Virtuous Troll: Argumentative Virtues in the Age of (Technologically Enhanced) Argumentative Pluralism

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Abstract

Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can argue whenever we want. With social media venues for every interest, we can also argue about whatever we want. To some extent, we can select our opponents and audiences to argue with whomever we want. And we can argue however we want, whether in carefully reasoned, article-length expositions, real-time exchanges, or 140-character polemics. The concepts of arguing, arguing well, and even being an arguer have evolved with this new multiplicity and diversity; theory needs to catch up to the new reality. Successful strategies for traditional contexts may be counterproductive in new ones; classical argumentative virtues may be liabilities in new situations. There are new complications to the theorist’s standard questions—What is an argument? and Who is an arguer?—while new ones move into the spotlight—Should we argue at all? and If so, why? Agent-based virtue argumentation theory provides a unifying framework for this radical plurality by coordinated redefinitions of the concepts of good arguers and good arguments. It remains true that good arguers contribute to good arguments, and good arguments satisfy good arguers, but the new diversity strains the old unity. Ironically, a unifying factor is provided by examining those paragons of bad arguers, argument trolls whose contributions to arguments are not very good, not really contributions, and, ultimately, not genuine argumentation.

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Notes

  1. Given that many trolls adopt Socrates as a role model, this is not how they conceive of themselves. See Phillips 2015 pp. 126ff.

  2. For the clearest statements of the tenets of virtue argumentation theory, see Aberdein 2010, 2014. For a survey of its recent successes and challenges, along with its program for the future, see Aberdein and Cohen 2016.

  3. Bowell and Kingsbury 2013, among others, have raised the objection against virtue theories that arguers and arguments are too independent to support this kind of linkage in argument evaluation, but see Aberdein 2014 and Paglieri 2015 for formidable replies.

  4. See Stevens 2016 and Cohen 2013b for accounts of different argumentative roles, their complementary relations, and the relevant skill-sets and virtues for each.

  5. Kornblith 1999 nicely distinguishes skill at offering reasons from being reasons-responsive as reasoners’ skills. The idea is developed into a more complete taxonomy of argumentative skills in Cohen 2013a.

  6. See Axtell 1997 for an excellent overview. Code 1984; Greco 1999, Axtell 2000, and Sosa 2000 offer clear statements of the positions.

  7. There are very good reasons for rejecting “doxastic voluntarism” in most contexts and in unrestricted forms. Since they do not apply to arguing, they will not be taken up here.

  8. Cohen 2013c refers to these, respectively, as “missing arguments” and “misbegotten arguments.”

  9. Walton and Krabbe 1995 provide these categories.

  10. Phillips 2015 pp. 160ff is a notable exception, advocating counter-trolling as a more effective strategy.

  11. While there are many definitions of trolls available, starting with the online lexicons, Netlingo and the Urban Dictionary, there is a burgeoning literature with no consensus definition.

  12. Psychological profiles of trolls are studied in Buckels et al. 2014 and discussed in Mooney 2014, but see Phillips 2015 (p. 43) for questions about both the methodology and reporting.

  13. So-called “concern trolls” may be motivated ultimately by political agendas, but that is adventitious to their status as trolls. See Moulitsas 2008.

  14. There are many online discussions of the Socrates-as-troll meme, including: http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/was-socrates-a-troll-56333.html.

  15. However, as one observant referee noted, many trolls would be quite happy to admit that they are disrespectful, but they would dispute the value of respect and thus reject the judgment that their disrespect is argumentatively un-virtuous. Partly inspired by Frankfurt 2005, Cohen 2009 argues that sincerity is indeed an important argumentative virtue.

  16. I am using a standard concept of virtue here as outlined in Zagzebski 1996, pp. 135ff, but it is also largely informed by Chapters 2 and 3 of Annas 2011.

  17. See Cohen 2013b for an account of kibitzers and for an argument for counting them as arguers, i.e., participants in an argument whose behavior contributes to the overall success or failure of the argumentation.

  18. Augustine, by way of Gandhi: http://www.catholic.com/quickquestions/who-said-love-the-sinner-hate-the-sin.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Fabio Paglieri for his encouragement, Andrew Aberdein for his exceptional philosophical acumen and scholarship, and anonymous referees for their extraordinarily helpful input, as well as Alex Sarappo and Hiya Islam, occasional trolls, without whom this paper would not have been possible.

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Correspondence to Daniel H. Cohen.

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Cohen, D.H. The Virtuous Troll: Argumentative Virtues in the Age of (Technologically Enhanced) Argumentative Pluralism. Philos. Technol. 30, 179–189 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0226-2

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