Abstract
Technology has made argumentation rampant. We can argue whenever we want. With social media venues for every interest, we can also argue about whatever we want. To some extent, we can select our opponents and audiences to argue with whomever we want. And we can argue however we want, whether in carefully reasoned, article-length expositions, real-time exchanges, or 140-character polemics. The concepts of arguing, arguing well, and even being an arguer have evolved with this new multiplicity and diversity; theory needs to catch up to the new reality. Successful strategies for traditional contexts may be counterproductive in new ones; classical argumentative virtues may be liabilities in new situations. There are new complications to the theorist’s standard questions—What is an argument? and Who is an arguer?—while new ones move into the spotlight—Should we argue at all? and If so, why? Agent-based virtue argumentation theory provides a unifying framework for this radical plurality by coordinated redefinitions of the concepts of good arguers and good arguments. It remains true that good arguers contribute to good arguments, and good arguments satisfy good arguers, but the new diversity strains the old unity. Ironically, a unifying factor is provided by examining those paragons of bad arguers, argument trolls whose contributions to arguments are not very good, not really contributions, and, ultimately, not genuine argumentation.
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Notes
Given that many trolls adopt Socrates as a role model, this is not how they conceive of themselves. See Phillips 2015 pp. 126ff.
There are very good reasons for rejecting “doxastic voluntarism” in most contexts and in unrestricted forms. Since they do not apply to arguing, they will not be taken up here.
Cohen 2013c refers to these, respectively, as “missing arguments” and “misbegotten arguments.”
Walton and Krabbe 1995 provide these categories.
Phillips 2015 pp. 160ff is a notable exception, advocating counter-trolling as a more effective strategy.
While there are many definitions of trolls available, starting with the online lexicons, Netlingo and the Urban Dictionary, there is a burgeoning literature with no consensus definition.
So-called “concern trolls” may be motivated ultimately by political agendas, but that is adventitious to their status as trolls. See Moulitsas 2008.
There are many online discussions of the Socrates-as-troll meme, including: http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/was-socrates-a-troll-56333.html.
However, as one observant referee noted, many trolls would be quite happy to admit that they are disrespectful, but they would dispute the value of respect and thus reject the judgment that their disrespect is argumentatively un-virtuous. Partly inspired by Frankfurt 2005, Cohen 2009 argues that sincerity is indeed an important argumentative virtue.
See Cohen 2013b for an account of kibitzers and for an argument for counting them as arguers, i.e., participants in an argument whose behavior contributes to the overall success or failure of the argumentation.
Augustine, by way of Gandhi: http://www.catholic.com/quickquestions/who-said-love-the-sinner-hate-the-sin.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Fabio Paglieri for his encouragement, Andrew Aberdein for his exceptional philosophical acumen and scholarship, and anonymous referees for their extraordinarily helpful input, as well as Alex Sarappo and Hiya Islam, occasional trolls, without whom this paper would not have been possible.
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Cohen, D.H. The Virtuous Troll: Argumentative Virtues in the Age of (Technologically Enhanced) Argumentative Pluralism. Philos. Technol. 30, 179–189 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0226-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0226-2