Abstract
When it comes to the question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental difference between humans and other entities? If so, on what basis, and what are the implications for science and ethics? This question is inherently imprecise, however, because it presupposes that we can readily determine what it means for two types of entities to be sufficiently different—what I will refer to as being “discontinuous”. In this paper, I will sketch a formal characterization of what it means for types of entities to be unique with regard to each other. This expands upon Bruce Mazlish’s initial formulation of what he terms a continuity between humans and machines, Alan Turing’s epistemological approach to the question of machine intelligence, and Sigmund Freud’s notion of scientific revolutions dealing blows to the self-esteem of mankind. I will discuss on what basis we should regard entities as (dis-)continuous, the corresponding moral and scientific implications, as well as an important difference between what I term downgrading and upgrading continuities—a dramatic difference in how two previously discontinuous types of entities might become continuous. All of this will be phrased in terms of which scientific levels of explanation we need to presuppose, in principle or in practice, when we seek to explain a given type of entity. The ultimate purpose is to provide a framework that defines which questions we need to ask if we argue that two types of entities ought (not) to be explained (hence treated) in the same manner, as well as what it takes to reconsider scientific and ethical hierarchies imposed on the natural and artificial world.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Cf. Søraker (2007) for an overview of the discussion of moral status from an ontological, property-based perspective.
I am very aware that this is far from precise, but it should be sufficient for establishing the more formal nature of continuities, which is the limited purpose of this paper. As Mieke Boon has pointed out to me, it is probably better to speak of actual scientific “practices of explanation”, but that will have to be reserved for future work.
For such an attempt, see Princeton University’s Laboratory for the Physics of Life (http://tglab.princeton.edu/).
One of the biggest and perhaps unavoidable problems with the proposed approach lies in defining what it means to have a “full” account of an entity, i.e., whether a set of levels of explanation is sufficient for explaining the structure and behavior of a system. I cannot possibly do this question justice in this paper, but it is perhaps best to define a “full account” negatively—that is, if you hold the view that humans cannot be explained without presupposing some form of phenomenal, indeterministic consciousness (what I will later refer to as a “cognitive” LoE), then you hold the view that a set of LoEs that does not include such a level, would not be able to provide a full account.
The term “cognitive” may be somewhat misleading, since cognitive is often regarded as including computational and other low-level, non-conscious information processing (see, e.g., Marr (1982)). I am using it here in the sense of mental processes related to thinking and conscious experience. It may have been better to use “phenomenal LoE,” but this comes with its own misleading connotations.
This reasoning accords with the principle of formal equality, one of the most fundamental and undisputed principles in ethics, which states that a difference in treatment or value between two kinds of entities can only be justified on the basis of a relevant and significant difference between the two (cf. Søraker (2007).
This actually illustrates how these schematics can lead us to ask the right kinds of questions, in the following manner: If (most) animals only require a physical, functional, and behavioral LoE, they are at least epistemically continuous with intelligent machines that are no longer explainable at a physical and functional level alone. Then the question becomes whether a “biological” LoE is necessary to understanding some types of entities, ipso facto, making them (epistemically or ontically) discontinuous with nonbiological entities.
References
Adler, M. J. (1993). The difference of man and the difference it makes. New York: Fordham University Press.
Atmanspacher, H. (2002). Determinism is ontic, determinability is epistemic. In H. Atmanspacher & R. Bishop (Eds.), Between chance and choice: interdisciplinary perspectives on determinism (pp. 49–74). Charlottesville: Imprint Academic.
Bransen, J. (Ed.). (2001). International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Oxford: Elsevier.
Bringsjord, S., & Arkoudas, K. (2006). On the provability, veracity, and AI-relevance of the Church Turing Thesis. In A. Olszewski, J. Woleński & R. Janusz (Eds.), Church’s Thesis After 70 Years (pp. 66–118).
Cat, J. (2010). The Unity of Science. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 ed.).
Chakravartty, A. (2013). Scientific Realism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition).
Copeland, J. (2002). Hypercomputation. Minds and Machines, 12, 461–502.
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 685–700.
Dennett, D. C. (1989). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dilthey, W. (1989). Introduction to the human sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dretske, F. I. (1991). Explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Feest, U. (2010). Historical perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen. Berlin: Springer.
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906–911.
Floridi, L. (2002). On the intrinsic value of information objects and the infosphere. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(4), 287–304.
Floridi, L. (2008). The method of levels of abstraction. Minds and Machines, 18(3), 303–329.
Freud, S. (1953). A difficulty in the path of psycho-analysis (Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyze). In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works (Vol. XVII, pp. 135–145). London: Hogarth.
Gallie, W. B. (1955). Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56, 167–198.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291–295.
Kant, I. (1780/1997). Lectures on Ethics (P. Heath, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, I. (1788/1997). Critique of Practical Reason (M. Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Mayes, G. R. (2005). Theories of Explanation. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved January 20, 2012, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/explanat/.
Mazlish, B. (1993). The fourth discontinuity. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Nagel, E. (1979). The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific explanation. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Penrose, R. (1999). The emperor’s new mind: concerning computers, minds, and the laws of physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Proudfoot, M., & Lacey, A. R. (2009). The Routledge dictionary of philosophy (4th ed.). New York: Routledge.
Putnam, H. (1991). Representation and reality. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Regan, T. (2004). The case for animal rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Searle, J. (1984). Minds, brains, and science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Singer, P. (1990). Animal Liberation (2nd ed.). London: Thorsons.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.
Søraker, J. H. (2007). The moral status of information and information technologies – a relational theory of moral status. In S. Hongladarom & C. Ess (Eds.), Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives (pp. 1–19). Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing.
Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 236, 433–460.
Wetlesen, J. (1999). The moral status of beings who are not persons: a casuistic argument. Environmental Values, 8, 287–323.
Williams, E. A. (2003). A cultural history of medical vitalism in enlightenment Montpellier. Farnham: Ashgate.
Acknowledgements
Since this is an idea that has resisted precision, hence publication, for more than 10 years, I can no longer thank everyone who has given me advice over the years. Most importantly among them, my then-supervisor Magne Dybvig played a very important role in the initial development. More recently, I am indebted to the helpful comments from several colleagues from my department, in particular Marianne Boenink, Mieke Boon, Philip Brey, Mark Coeckelbergh, and Pak Hang Wong. I am also indebted to the feedback and encouragement from the participants at the AISB/IACAP 2012 conference symposium on ‘The Machine Question’, in particular Joanna Bryson, David Gunkel, Steve Torrance and Wendell Wallach. I would also like to acknowledge the very useful and constructive feedback from the journal’s anonymous referees – in particular “reviewer #1” who provided an extraordinarily detailed and insightful analysis that was of immense help. The usual disclaimer applies.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Søraker, J.H. Continuities and Discontinuities Between Humans, Intelligent Machines, and Other Entities. Philos. Technol. 27, 31–46 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-013-0132-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-013-0132-9