European Journal for Philosophy of Science

, Volume 2, Issue 3, pp 249–274

Defending the Semantic View: what it takes

Authors

    • Department of Philosophy LA 101University of Montana
Original paper in Philosophy of Science

DOI: 10.1007/s13194-011-0026-6

Cite this article as:
Le Bihan, S. Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2012) 2: 249. doi:10.1007/s13194-011-0026-6

Abstract

In this paper, a modest version of the Semantic View is motivated as both tenable and potentially fruitful for philosophy of science. An analysis is proposed in which the Semantic View is characterized by three main claims. For each of these claims, a distinction is made between stronger and more modest interpretations. It is argued that the criticisms recently leveled against the Semantic View hold only under the stronger interpretations of these claims. However, if one only commits to the modest interpretation for all the claims, then the view obtained, the Modest Semantic View, is tenable and fruitful for the philosophy of science.

Keywords

Models Semantic View Scientific theories Scientific models Structure Structuralism

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2011