Original Article in Philosophy of Science

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 39-46

Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?

  • Brian LaetzAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, University of British Columbia Email author 

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Abstract

Bayesians regard their solution to the paradox of confirmation as grounds for preferring their theory of confirmation to Hempel’s. They point out that, unlike Hempel, they can at least say that a black raven confirms “All ravens are black” more than a white shoe. However, I argue that this alleged advantage is cancelled out by the fact that Bayesians are equally committed to the view that a white shoe confirms “All non-black things are non-ravens” less than a black raven. In light of this, I reexamine the dialectic between Hempel and the Bayesians.

Keywords

Paradox of confirmation Paradox of the ravens Bayesianism Carl Hempel