, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 39-46
Date: 26 Nov 2010

Does the Bayesian solution to the paradox of confirmation really support Bayesianism?

Abstract

Bayesians regard their solution to the paradox of confirmation as grounds for preferring their theory of confirmation to Hempel’s. They point out that, unlike Hempel, they can at least say that a black raven confirms “All ravens are black” more than a white shoe. However, I argue that this alleged advantage is cancelled out by the fact that Bayesians are equally committed to the view that a white shoe confirms “All non-black things are non-ravens” less than a black raven. In light of this, I reexamine the dialectic between Hempel and the Bayesians.

Brian Laetz died in a traffic accident on March 18th, while this article was still under review. The editors wish to express their condolences to Mr. Laetz’s friends and family. We thank Mr. Laetz’s family for permission to proceed with publication of this article, and thank Paul Bartha for correcting the page proofs.