European Journal for Philosophy of Science

, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 89–118

Genuinely collective emotions

Original paper in the Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences

DOI: 10.1007/s13194-010-0006-2

Cite this article as:
Huebner, B. Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2011) 1: 89. doi:10.1007/s13194-010-0006-2


It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.


Distributed cognitionEmotion

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyGeorgetown UniversityWashingtonUSA