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The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture

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Abstract

Choice architecture is heralded as a policy approach that does not coercively reduce freedom of choice. Still we might worry that this approach fails to respect individual choice because it subversively manipulates individuals, thus contravening their personal autonomy. In this article I address two arguments to this effect. First, I deny that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous. I explain the reasons we have for avoiding heteronomous policy-making and offer a set of four conditions for non-heteronomy. I then provide examples of nudges that meet these conditions. I argue that these policies are capable of respecting and promoting personal autonomy, and show this claim to be true across contrasting conceptions of autonomy. Second, I deny that choice architecture is disrespectful because it is epistemically paternalistic. This critique appears to loom large even against non-heteronomous nudges. However, I argue that while some of these policies may exhibit epistemically paternalistic tendencies, these tendencies do not necessarily undermine personal autonomy. Thus, if we are to find such policies objectionable, we cannot do so on the grounds of respect for autonomy.

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Notes

  1. In his most recent work on choice architecture, Sunstein (2014b, pp. 34–50) describes these phenomena as ‘behavioural market failures’. He groups these into four distinct sets: 1) present bias, time inconsistency and inter-temporal internalities; 2) saliency and shrouded attributes; 3) unrealistic optimism; and 4) problems with probability and availability.

  2. Here I characterise paternalism as a motivational wrong. This characterisation is contestable. For more on the plausibility of this characterisation and paternalism’s justificatory burden, see Mills 2013b.

  3. This is partly due to Sunstein and Thaler’s repeated refusal to engage at any great length with autonomy as an intrinsically valuable consideration (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, p. 1167, n. 22; Sunstein 2014b, p. 134). For the most detailed attempt, see Sunstein 2014c.

  4. For more on the various other ways we might define personal autonomy (and whether it can be characterised in one single way), see Feinberg 1989.

  5. On a strictly Kantian definition, heteronomous motivation is based on an impulse foreign from our reason, including inclinations (Kant 2012, 4:444). As such impulses do not originate from our rational will they prevent us from self-legislation. Further, because such impulses are not necessarily shared by all rational agents, they cannot justify universal categorical imperatives. This Kantian understanding of heteronomy is slightly narrower than the one that motivates my concern. Kantians interpret heteronomy through their interest in the possibility of moral autonomy and universal categorical moral obligations. I am merely concerned with sources of reasons for action that override the capacity for personal autonomy and I adopt the term with this broader usage in mind.

  6. This ensures that when employed paternalistically, nudges are instances of means paternalism rather than ends paternalism (Sunstein 2014b, p. 19).

  7. For an interesting argument concerning how the opt-out clause may combine with the intentions of the choice architect, see Wilkinson 2013, pp. 351–353.

  8. In Rawls’ original expression of his theory, he states that according to the publicity condition: ‘The parties assume that they are choosing principles for a public conception of justice. They suppose that everyone will know about these principles all that he would know if their acceptance were the result of an agreement. Thus the general awareness of their universal acceptance should have desirable effects and support the stability of social cooperation.’ (Rawls 1971, p. 133). Larmore suggests the following interpretation: ‘The point is that just as the validity of a contract does not turn solely on the terms agreed to, but also on the fact of agreement, so justice consists in more than the proper distribution of rights and assets. Principles of justice should also be public, each of us affirming them in light of the fact that others affirm them too…. Equally important is the publicity of its defining principles—that our reason for accepting them turns on others having reason to accept them too.’ (Larmore 2002, p. 370, italics original).

  9. For the claim that consensual nudging respects personal autonomy, see Wilkinson 2013, p. 353.

  10. This invites us to think more closely about the relationship between choice architecture and public reason. Such reflection is sadly outside of the scope of this paper; however two points are worth mentioning here. First, the relationship between choice architecture, publicity and public reason may not be as strong as implied (as our publicity condition could take a non-Rawlsian form). Second, Rawlsians may object to choice architecture as a policy method that fails to treat citizens as free and equal (Rawls 2001, pp. 18–24; 2005, pp. 29–35).

  11. In contrast, framing effects intended to subvert the subject’s will impose an epistemic cost on their behaviour. For more on the implications of this for consent, see Hanna 2011.

  12. For the stronger claim that nudging may be required to respect autonomous choice, see Sunstein 2014a.

  13. See also Watson 1975; Young 1980; Dworkin 1988; Ekstrom 1993; Frankfurt 1998; Cuypers 2000; Bratman 2003.

  14. See also Meyers 1989; Mackensie and Stoljar 2000; Oshana 2006.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Ethical Statement

This article required no research involving participants and did not receive funding from any non-academic body.

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The author declares that they have no conflict of interest.

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  1. Centre for Ethics and Law, UCL Faculty of Laws, Bentham House, London, WC1H 0EG, UK

    Chris Mills

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Mills, C. The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture. Rev.Phil.Psych. 6, 495–509 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0242-7

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