Abstract
Hidden nature physicalists hold that an experiential quality and its hidden nature are the same property – even though they agree that our experiences are of experiential qualities but are not, in the same sense, experiences of their hidden natures. This paper argues that physicalists must be committed to ultimately giving accounts that involve no non-extensional relations, and that this commitment leads to an inability to explain how our experiences could be of experiential qualities, but not of their hidden natures.
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Notes
Thus, Hill (2009, p. 118): “[I]f the Cartesian argument is to succeed, . . . the essential nature of pain must be fully accessible to us when we experience pain. But it is precisely this thesis about the essential nature of pain that is called into question . . . . There is no guarantee that experiential representations of pain will do full justice to its essential properties.” Tye (2009, p. 142) describes a view he rejects as holding that “experience itself reveals red or canary yellow as simple, as not having a hidden nature”. P. S. Churchland (1998, p. 117) expresses hidden nature physicalism this way. “What is troublesome is the idea that all the reality there is to a sensation is available through sheerly having it. . . . I suggest, instead, a rather simple alternative: A sensation of pain is real, but not everything about the nature of pain is revealed in introspection – its neural substrate, for example, is not so revealed. (Emphasis in original. It is clear from her context that by “neural substrate”, Churchland does not mean “neural cause”.)
Others have reached conclusions similar to those in this paper; for recent examples see, e.g., Goff (2011), Nida-Rümelin (2007), White (2007). The argument of the present paper, however, takes a distinctive approach that offers relative simplicity and reliance on relatively few assumptions about concepts.
For extensive discussion of issues connected with explicating construction, see Chalmers (2012).
In what amounts to a survey of leading views, P. M. Churchland (1984, p. 29) presents reductive materialism (aka identity theory) as holding that “In discriminating red from blue, sweet from sour, and hot from cold, our external senses are actually discriminating between subtle differences in intricate electromagnetic, stereochemical, and micromechanical properties of physical objects”.
My use of HNP5 is evidently indebted to Sellars’ (1963) “grain argument”. It should be borne in mind, however, that Sellars aimed at a conclusion far stronger than any that is asserted in this paper, and relied on several assumptions that are also not made in this paper. (See Richardson and Muilenberg (1982) for discussion.) The present argument should thus be evaluated on its own merits.
This formulation is simplified for readability. In general, common color names correspond to many kinds of reflectance profiles, and even particular shades may correspond to a plurality of profiles, so that the relevant property is actually having some member of such and such set of RP s. Similarly for the following examples: there are many sugars, and perhaps many kinds of neural events that correspond to having an afterimage of a particular kind.
One can, of course, insist on an extensional reading of “an experience of F”, according to which an experience of F is also an experience of HNF. But phenomenological plausibility requires a hidden nature physicalist to have some verb that can be used to express the hiddenness of hidden natures --the idea that we do not <Verb> F’s hidden nature just by <Verbing> F; and the argument can then be run with whatever verb is offered for this purpose.
“Intentional” is used here because the problem starts with contexts that contain verbs indicating aboutness. Of course, the reason NI is a difficult problem is that such verbs introduce intensional (or hyper-intensional) contexts.
Non-extensional relations may, of course, continue to appear in partial constructions or reductions of non-extensional relations. For example, progress in constructing the relation of believing may occur in a view that still contains the non-extensional relation of having a function of indicating. But the project of naturalizing intentionality cannot be regarded as having been completed unless, at the end of the day, only physical, extensional relations appear in the construction.
This paragraph will remind readers of other discussions, notably those of Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (2010). But, as with simplicity and Sellars’ grain argument, it should be noted that the use of the water example is targeted to a narrow conclusion about HNP, and that it does not rely on assumptions often associated with the example – e.g., assumptions about the relation between conceivability and possibility. The use of the example in this paper should be evaluated on its own merits.
Even if one were willing to allow this implausible logical impossibility, property identity would not be assured. Triangular equiangularity and triangular equilaterality are logically equivalent, but not obviously the same property. Chisholm (1992), e.g., takes them to be distinct properties.
For explanation of “conceptual dualism” see Chapter 2 of Papineau (2002).
But see Gennaro (2012) for an attempt to overcome this difficulty.
It may be noted that our first quotation from Tye says that one is “directly acquainted with red29 via [one’s] consciousness of it.” But the hiddenness of hidden natures can be expressed as the claim that, in some sense, hidden natures are not in our consciousness (see HNP5). So, there seems to be some reason to attribute the first alternative below to Tye; but the matter is unclear, since it also seems natural to think that a relation that is stated emphatically to be non-conceptual and non-propositional would be an extensional relation.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Stephen Biggs for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Robinson, W.S. Hidden Nature Physicalism. Rev.Phil.Psych. 7, 71–89 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0238-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0238-3