Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp 621–638

Truth, Correspondence, and Gender


DOI: 10.1007/s13164-013-0155-2

Cite this article as:
Barnard, R. & Ulatowski, J. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2013) 4: 621. doi:10.1007/s13164-013-0155-2


Philosophical theorizing about truth manifests a desire to conform to the ordinary or folk notion of truth. This practice often involves attempts to accommodate some form of correspondence. We discuss this accommodation project in light of two empirical projects intended to describe the content of the ordinary conception of truth. One, due to Arne Naess, claims that the ordinary conception of truth is not correspondence. Our more recent study is consistent with Naess’ result. Our findings suggest that contextual factors and respondent gender affect whether the folk accept that correspondence is sufficient for truth. These findings seem to show that the project of accommodating the ordinary notion of truth is more difficult than philosophers had anticipated because it is fragmentary.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of MississippiUniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of WyomingLaramieUSA