Folk Concepts of Intentional Action in the Contexts of Amoral and Immoral Luck
- First Online:
- Cite this article as:
- Sousa, P. & Holbrook, C. Rev.Phil.Psych. (2010) 1: 351. doi:10.1007/s13164-010-0028-x
- 98 Views
This paper concerns a recently discovered, puzzling asymmetry in judgments of whether an action is intentional or not (Knobe, Philosophical Psychology 16:309–324, 2003a; Analysis 63:190–193, b). We report new data replicating the asymmetry in the context of scenarios wherein an agent achieves an amoral or immoral goal due to luck. Participants’ justifications of their judgments of the intentionality of the agent’s action indicate that two distinct folk concepts of intentional action played a role in their judgments. When viewed from this perspective, the puzzle disappears, although the asymmetry remains.