Abstract
Hybrid regimes have posed an empiric, methodological and conceptual challenge to academics since their emergence in the early 1990s. One of the most ambitious studies of the nature and behavior of hybrids in the past decade is Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s 2010 book, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge University Press).
In this “era of unprecedented abundance of cross-national political data” (Mudde and Schedler, Pol Res Quart 63(2):410–416, 2010, p. 410), the Levitsky and Way framework both organizes data into a uniquely operable model and contributes to it by generating new information on regime type. Yet those who look to build and expand upon it must be aware of the “structural problems of information about data supply and data quality” (Mudde and Schedler, Pol Res Quart 63(2):410–416, 2010, p. 410) inherent in current political quantitative data and models. The competitive authoritarian (CA) model is no exception to these problems. In order to reproduce it and to use the regime model and theory for further research, it is necessary to address a number of conceptual, methodological and empirical deficiencies present in the work.
This article assesses Levitsky and Way’s CA regime classification model by independently reproducing it in the 14 Sub-Saharan African countries in the original analysis as well as in a limited number of additional cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper opens with a presentation of the core concepts of competitive authoritarianism, an argument for the purpose of the present study, and an overview of the CA model. The replication exercise is described and the findings are reviewed in detail. The paper closes with a systematic analysis of the work, drawing on Munck and Verkuilen’s framework (Comp Pol Stud 35(1):5–34, 2002) for assessing quality of democracy data. I describe the most significant empirical indeterminacies that arise from the methodological indeterminacies identified in the replication exercise. I conclude that the inability to replicate the case selection undermines the usefulness of the proposed model to systematically identify CA. I consider how the broader conclusions of the original work are impacted by these findings, specifically how the persistence of competitive authoritarianism in this region is impacted by variations in case selection. The article offers recommendations on how to address shortcomings in the model in order to strengthen it and adapt it to the study of other non-CA hybrid regimes.
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Notes
Calculated by the author from the results in the reference publication.
In Africa alone, Levitsky and Way’s study only recognizes 14 CA cases, although Freedom House identified almost twice the number of “Partly Free” states during the baseline period (1990–1995).
Such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation.
The criteria for full authoritarian elections are that there are no national-level elections or that national-level elections are essentially non-competitive (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 365).
Democracy is measured according to five criteria, three of which refer to previously coded elements. The two new conditions are (1) “the existence of near-universal suffrage” (compared to “broad adult suffrage” under CA—a negligible distinction in practice) and (2) “basic civil liberties (speech, press, association) are systematically protected” (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 368).
CA regimes must meet three basic conditions: (1) not meet the conditions of full authoritarianism, (2) respect broad adult suffrage and (3) unelected “tutelary” powers cannot restrict the authority of elected governments (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 365).
Appendix I, Regime Scores 1990–1995, pp. 369–370.
Ancedotal information on the basis for exclusion is provided in an ad hoc manner for a number of individual cases, however no data to systematically document the basis for exclusion has been made publically available to date. This is most likely attributable to the “least common denominator” approach to coding the cases, as explained in the concluding section.
Freedom House’s scale is divided according to “Free” (1 to 2.5), “Partly Free” (3 to 5) and “Not Free” (5.5 to 7).
Uganda, 1994, was excluded because the elections were for a constituent assembly only.
Anaïs Auvray, France, B.Sc. International Studies (Université de Montréal); Hélène Trehin, France, B.A. International Studies (Université de Montréal); Yanick L. Touchette, Canada, B.A. Honors, International Development Studies (McGill University), M.Sc. Political Science (current, Université de Montréal).
Three of the 160 + sources were published after 2010, however these were used to clarify information and did not affect the overall coding decisions.
The baseline year is defined as the year between 1990 and 1995 in which multi-party elections were held for legislative/parliamentary office. In some cases, executive elections were also held during the same electoral cycle. The “Partly Free” classification is the closest corresponding classification to CA.
Funding for the double-coding was provided through the author’s 2012 Trudeau Scholarship.
“Unanimous” cases were those where both coders were in agreement with Levitsky and Way; “borderline” cases were those where only one coder identified the case as CA.
We assessed Cameroon based on both the presidential and legislative elections that took place in 1992, although they were separated by eight months.
This did not affect the electoral variables. Electoral variables were coded for pertinent issues present during the electoral process defined as starting from the official announcement of elections and/or opening of official campaign period, ending with the investiture of the new offices.
In cases of post-conflict and transitional elections, the period starts with the signature of the peace accord or the transfer of power to a transitional body following a national conference.
Dual game behavior refers to opposition groups that seek to win power by existing rules while simultaneously trying to change them (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 32), often though manipulative and violent tactics.
Mozambique, Mali
Benin, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali, Niger, Madagascar.
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Bardall, G. Coding competitive authoritarianism. Z Vgl Polit Wiss 10 (Suppl 1), 19–46 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-015-0259-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-015-0259-4