Abstract
Africa’s political landscape has changed profoundly over the past two decades. The crisis of many military and single-party regimes led to the widespread adoption of reforms that, in many countries, stopped short of full democratization but opened the way to the institutionalization of limited forms of political competition. While it is now evident that competitive authoritarianism is not a transitory phenomenon, it is less clear whether formal democratic institutions may nonetheless have a beneficial effect. Specifically, yet to be evaluated is the ability of these democratic institutions to shape government commitment to improving the wellbeing of citizens in an environment deeply affected by neo-patrimonial practices, such as African politics. This article presents the findings of one of the first inquiries into the socioeconomic consequences of competitive authoritarianism. Our main conclusion is that electoral mechanisms do favour some social improvements even within the context of an authoritarian setting.
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Notes
We are aware of contributing to the proliferation of alternative ways of moving from degrees to types (Bogaards 2010). Rather than dismissing past works, however, we build on them. When we combine FH and P4 scores, for instance, we are following Howard and Roessler (2006). Likewise, our focus on the sub-components of existing indices echoes Doorenspleet (2000). Finally, we would like to stress that by choosing the logical operator AND to aggregate the selected sub-components, we are setting rather demanding criteria for democracy (cf. Diamond 2002).
Data on spending is only available from 1995 onwards. We do not include education spending in our variables because of the poor data quality.
In the fixed effects model heteroscedasticity has been tackled by computing robust standard errors using a Huber/White estimator of variance.
This latter analysis has been run only on indicators of outputs due to data availability (cf. footnote 2).
In ECM the short-term effect of a given variable corresponds to the coefficient associated with its delta.
The full long-term effect of a given variable is computed as the ratio between the coefficient of its lag and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.
The high absolute value of this estimate can be explained by the fact that it refers to Africa, a largely underdeveloped continent. This is confirmed by the several cases in which these percentages exceed 100, following the launch of universal basic schooling programs involving thousands of overage children.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Political regimes in Africa 1980–2008*
1.1.1 Competitive autocracies
Algeria 1997–2008; Angola 1993–1996; Burkina Faso 1992–2008; Burundi 2005–2008; Cameroon 1992–2008; Central African Republic 1993–2002; Central African Republic 2005–2008; Chad 1997–2008; Comoros 1992–1994; Comoros 2004–2008; Congo (Kinshasa) 2006–2008; Congo (Brazzaville) 1994–1996; Congo (Brazzaville) 2002–2008; Cote d’Ivoire 1990–1998; Egypt 2005–2008; Equatorial Guinea 1996–2008; Ethiopia 1995–2008; Gabon 1993–2008; Gambia 1981–1986; Gambia 1997–2008; Ghana 1993–1996; Guinea 1995–2007; Guinea-Bissau 1994–1997; Guinea-Bissau 2000–2002; Guinea-Bissau 2005–2008; Kenya 1992–2002; Kenya 2007–2008; Liberia 1997–2000; Liberia 2006–2008; Madagascar 1993–2002; Madagascar 2006–2008; Malawi 2001–2008; Mauritania 1992–2004; Mozambique 1994–2006; Niger 1993–2003; Nigeria 1999–2008; Rwanda 2003–2008; Senegal 1980–2001; Sierra Leone 2002–2006; Sudan 1986–1988; Tanzania 1995–2008; Togo 1994–2008; Tunisia 1999–2008; Uganda 1980–1984; Uganda 2006–2008; Zambia 1993–2007; Zimbabwe 1980–2008.
1.1.2 Democracies
Benin 1991–2008; Botswana 1980–2008; Gambia 1987–1993; Ghana 1997–2008; Kenya 2003–2006; Lesotho 2002–2008; Madagascar 2003–2005; Malawi 1994–2000; Mali 1995–2008; Mauritius 1980–2008; Mozambique 2007–2008; Namibia 1990–2008; Niger 2004–2006; Nigeria 1980–1982; Senegal 2002–2008; South Africa 1994–2008.
1.1.3 Full autocracies
Algeria 1980–1996; Angola 1980–1992; Angola 1997–2008; Benin 1980–1990; Burkina Faso 1980–1991; Burundi 1980–2004; Cameroon 1980–1991; Central African Republic 1980–1992; Chad 1980–1996; Comoros 1980–1991; Comoros 1995–2003; Congo (Kinshasa) 1980–2005; Congo (Brazzaville) 1980–1991; Congo (Brazzaville) 1997–2001; Cote d’Ivoire 1980–1989; Cote d’Ivoire 2002–2008; Djibouti 1980–2008; Egypt 1980–2004; Equatorial Guinea 1980–1994; Eritrea 1993–2008; Ethiopia 1980–1994; Gabon 1980–1992; Gabon 1994–1996; Ghana 1981–1992; Guinea 1980–1994; Guinea-Bissau 1980–1993; Kenya 1980–1991; Lesotho 1980–2001; Liberia 1980–1996; Liberia 2001–2005; Libya 1980–2008; Madagascar 1980–1992; Malawi 1980–1993; Mali 1980–1990; Mauritania 1980–1991; Morocco 1980–2008; Mozambique 1980–1993; Niger 1980–1992; Nigeria 1983–1998; Rwanda 1980–2002; Sierra Leone 1980–2001; Somalia 1980–1990; South Africa 1980–1993; Sudan 1980–1985; Sudan 1989–2008; Swaziland 1980–2008; Tanzania 1980–1994; Togo 1980–1993; Tunisia 1980–1998; Uganda 1985–2005; Zambia 1980–1990.
Notes: Only regimes that lasted 3 years or longer are listed. Regime periods are left-censored.
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Cassani, A., Carbone, G. Citizen wellbeing in African competitive authoritarian regimes. Z Vgl Polit Wiss 10 (Suppl 1), 191–214 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-015-0256-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-015-0256-7