Neuroethics

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 105–107

Addiction, Compulsion, and Agency

Authors

Brief Communication

DOI: 10.1007/s12152-013-9184-x

Cite this article as:
Di Nucci, E. Neuroethics (2014) 7: 105. doi:10.1007/s12152-013-9184-x

Abstract

I show that Pickard’s argument against the irresistibility of addiction fails because her proposed dilemma, according to which either drug-seeking does not count as action or addiction is resistible, is flawed; and that is the case whether or not one endorses Pickard’s controversial definition of action. Briefly, we can easily imagine cases in which drug-seeking meets Pickard’s conditions for agency without thereby implying that the addiction was not irresistible, as when the drug addict may take more than one route to go meet her dealer.

Keywords

AddictionCompulsionAgencyFreedomAlternative possibilitiesCausalism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013