Date: 14 Jun 2011
The Folk Epistemology of Delusions
- Dominic Murphy
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Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.
Currie, G. 2000. Imagination, delusion and hallucinations. In Pathologies of Belief, ed. M. Coltheart and M. Davies, 167–182. Oxford: Blackwell.
Nozick, R. 1993. The Nature of Rationality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- The Folk Epistemology of Delusions
Volume 5, Issue 1 , pp 19-22
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- Springer Netherlands
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- Folk psychology
- Dominic Murphy (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia