Neuroethics

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 19–22

The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s12152-011-9125-5

Cite this article as:
Murphy, D. Neuroethics (2012) 5: 19. doi:10.1007/s12152-011-9125-5

Abstract

Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms.

Keywords

DelusionFolk psychologyBelief

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia