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Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences

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Abstract

Bortolotti’s Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs defends the view that delusions are beliefs on a continuum with other beliefs. A different view is that delusions are more like illusions, that is, they arise from faulty perception. This view, which is not targeted by the book, makes it easier to explain why delusions are so alien and disabling but needs to appeal to forensic aspects of functioning.

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Correspondence to Jakob Hohwy.

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Hohwy, J., Rajan, V. Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences. Neuroethics 5, 5–11 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9124-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-011-9124-6

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