Date: 12 Mar 2011
Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self
- Miriam Kyselo
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It has been argued that Extended Cognition (EXT), a recently much discussed framework in the philosophy of cognition, would serve as the theoretical basis to account for the impact of Brain Computer Interfaces (BCI) on the self and life of patients with Locked-in Syndrome (LIS). In this paper I will argue that this claim is unsubstantiated, EXT is not the appropriate theoretical background for understanding the role of BCI in LIS. I will critically assess what a theory of the extended self would comprise and provide a list of desiderata for a theory of self that EXT fails to accommodate for. There is, however, an alternative framework in Cognitive Science, Enactivism, which entails the basis for an account of self that is able to accommodate for these desiderata. I will outline some first steps towards an Enactive approach to the self, suggesting that the self could be considered as a form of human autonomy. Understanding the self from an enactive point of view will allow to shed new light on the questions of whether and how BCIs affect or change the selves of patients with LIS.
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- Locked-in Syndrome and BCI - Towards an Enactive Approach to the Self
Volume 6, Issue 3 , pp 579-591
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Locked-in syndrome
- Extended cognition
- Miriam Kyselo (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Albrechtstraße 28, 49069, Osnabrück, Germany