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Justifying Human Rights: Does Consensus Matter?

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Abstract

This paper is a critical examination of a widely accepted method of human rights justification. The method defends the universality of human rights by appeal to diverse worldviews that converge on human rights norms. By showing that the norms can be justified from the perspective of diverse worldviews, human rights theorists suggest that there is reason to believe that human rights are universal norms that should govern the institutions of all societies. This paper argues that the evidence of plural foundations of human rights fails to increase our confidence in the universality of human rights. The paper defends the following claims: (1) the convergence on human rights is better explained as an accidental outcome than as an indicator of the universality of human rights, (2) the plurality of human rights justification is superfluous to the explanation of why human rights apply to all societies, (3) the aggregation of justifications decreases rather than increases the reliability of the universality belief, and (4) the reasonable disagreement among conflicting justifications generates an epistemic dilemma.

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Notes

  1. “When you fast, anoint your head and wash your face so that you do not appear to others to be fasting, but to your Father, who is in the secret place; and your Father, who sees in secret, will reward you openly” (Jesus Christ, Matthew 6:16–18); “She or he who does good of her or his own accord shall be rewarded, but to fast is better for you, if you but knew it” (Prophet Mohammed); “When you fast, the Light will illuminate you and spread on earth” (Mahatma Gandhi).

  2. Buddhism: “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” (Udana-Varga 5,1); Christianity: “All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.” (Matthew 7:1); Confucianism: “Do not do to others what you would not like yourself. Then there will be no resentment against you, either in the family or in the state.” (Analects 12:2); Hinduism: “This is the sum of duty; do naught onto others what you would not have them do unto you.” (Mahabharata 5,1517); Islam: “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.” (Sunnah); Judaism: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellowman. This is the entire Law; all the rest is commentary.” (Talmud, Shabbat 3id); Taoism: “Regard your neighbor’s gain as your gain, and your neighbor’s loss as your own loss.” (Tai Shang Kan Yin P’ien).

  3. The scope of the norms above (fasting and the Golden Rule) was determined by the worldviews rather than independent principles. Fasting is a local norm in so far as it is an object of convergence among worldviews. On the other hand, fasting would be a global norm if it were derived from a principle of prudence: we should engage in practices that promote our health. On the assumption that fasting is a practice that promotes our health, fasting would apply globally across religious and cultural divide. The scope of human rights relevant to the following discussion is determined by the worldviews rather than the moral principles that generate human rights. This paper examines human rights from the perspective of diverse worldviews. The relevant scope of human rights in this section is determined by the worldviews that limit rights to some persons or extend rights to all persons.

  4. It should be noted that the author does not dismiss the universalist language employed in the Cairo Declaration. According to Article 1, “All human beings form one family whose members are united by submission to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. True faith is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human perfection.” The declaration groups all persons into one category, i.e., those in submission to God, and attributes equal dignity to all persons. However, the declaration provides reason for enhancing dignity, i.e., performing duties entailed by rights, that applies only to persons with “true faith” or Muslims. It appears, then, that the reason does not apply to non-Muslims, who are not reasonably expected to be moved by it. By implication, the declaration justifies a local norm since it generates an obligation for some (the faithful) but not all persons.

  5. One might argue that even if each testimony undermines the probability that the other testimony is true, together they increase the probability that the defendant is innocent by placing him at a location different from the crime scene. It would be reasonable to increase one’s confidence in the defendant’s innocence after hearing two conflicting testimonies. This would be the correct conclusion under the assumption that at least one of the testimonies is true. However, there is no reason do not posit this background assumption. I benefitted from conversations with Eric Hiddleston, Larry Lombard, Bruce Russell, and Sean Stidd regarding the alternative analysis.

  6. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions in clarifying this argument.

  7. I thank Bruce Russell for pointing out this distinction.

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Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank William Talbott, Sean Stidd, Angela Smith, Jamie Mayerfeld Larry Lombard, John Corvino, and three anonymous reviewers at Human Rights Review for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Correspondence to Eun-Jung Katherine Kim.

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Kim, EJ.K. Justifying Human Rights: Does Consensus Matter?. Hum Rights Rev 13, 261–278 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-012-0232-4

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