Abstract
In this analysis of William Talbott’s important book, I note with appreciation his defense of universal moral principles and of moral justification as a “social project,” his focus on the critique of oppression, and his emphasis on empathic understanding in the account of human rights. I go on to develop some criticisms regarding: 1) Talbott’s traditional understanding of human rights as holding against governments and not also applying to nonstate actors; 2) his account of the interrelations among well-being, autonomy, claims for first person authority in moral judgment, and human rights; 3) his strongly rationalist and liberal individualist interpretation of moral judgment and autonomy; and 4) the lack of a role for intercultural dialogue about human rights, which nonetheless are held to apply to all human beings across cultures. In each case, I briefly consider what an alternative approach would look like.
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Notes
William Talbott, Which Rights should be Universal? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 33–45.
Carol C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), especially Chapters 2 and 12.
For example, in regard to societies that treated women as men’s property, Talbott, Which Rights should be Universal?, 90.
Ibid, 159–160.
Ibid, 32.
See Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); the social ontology is presented in chapters 1 & 2 and the implications for human rights are discussed in chapter 7 entitled “What are the Human Rights?” Also, see Carol C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, especially Chapter 1.
Talbott, Which Rights should be Universal?, 105. On empathy, one can mention for example Diana T. Meyers, Subjection and Subjectivity (New York: Routledge, 1994) and Sandra Lee Bartky, Sympathy and Solidarity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); see also Carol C. Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, Chapter 12. On the relation of reason and the emotions, the feminist philosophy literature is vast including such writings as Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) and Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Understandings (New York: Routledge, 1998) and Moral Contexts (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). On the role of equal parenting in contributing to empathic and caring children, the literature is also substantial, including such authors as Nancy J. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (University of California Press, 1978); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989); and Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989.
Plato, Republic, trans. Francis Cornford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), VII. 518.
Talbott, Which Rights should be Universal?, 122.
Ibid, 137.
Ibid, 37–38.
Ibid, 93.
See, for example, the discussions by these authors and others in Rebecca J. Cook, ed., Human Rights of Women (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), and Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds., Women’s Rights, Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 1995).
See Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, especially Chapters 7, 8, and 9.
See Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, chapter 1, and Rethinking Democracy, Chapters 1 and 7.
Talbott, Which Rights should be Universal?, 134 top.
Ibid, 125.
Ibid, 134.
Ibid.
Ibid, 173.
Ibid.
For a good short statement of Gewirth’s argument, see his “The Basis and Content of Human Rights,” in Human Rights, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 124–34. For relevant critiques, see the articles in that volume by Richard B. Friedman, “The Basis of Human Rights: A Criticism of Gewirth’s Theory,” and Martin P. Golding, “From Prudence to Rights: A Critique,” pp. 148–157 and 165–74; as well as Carol C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy, 69–70.
Talbott, Which Rights should be Universal?
Ibid, 172–173.
On common activity and social self-determination see Gould, Rethinking Democracy, Chapters 1 and 12.
See Carol C. Gould, “Self-Determination beyond Sovereignty: Relating Transnational Democracy to Local Autonomy,” in Journal of Social Philosophy, Special Issue on Democracy and Globalization, Vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring, 2006): 44–60.
Martha Nussbaum, “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings,” in Women, Culture, and Development, ed. Jonathan Glover and Martha Nussbaum (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61–104; and Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the participants in the original APA session for their helpful comments and especially my fellow panelists James Nickel, David Reidy, and William Talbott.
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Initially presented at the session “Author-Meets-Critics: William J. Talbott, Which Rights Should Be Universal?”, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Portland, Oregon, March 26, 2006.
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Gould, C.C. The Theory of Universal Human Rights: A Comment on Talbott. Hum Rights Rev 9, 157–165 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-007-0040-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-007-0040-4