Abstract
Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are supposed to constitute counter-examples to the principle of alternate possibilities, for they are cases in which we have the intuition that an agent is morally responsible for his action, even though he could not have done otherwise. In a recent paper, Swenson (2015) rejects this conclusion, on the basis of a comparison between standard FSCs, which typically feature actions, and similar cases involving omissions. Because the absence of alternate possibilities seems to preclude moral responsibility in the cases of omissions, and because there is no morally relevant difference between the cases of actions and omissions, Swenson concludes that agents are not morally responsible in standard FSCs. In the present paper, I argue that Swenson’s argument fails because there are at least two very important differences between both types of cases. First, there is a difference about whether agents in such cases actually perform the relevant action: while agents actually perform the relevant action in standard FSCs, they do not in FSCs supposedly involving omissions, for omissions require the possibility to have done otherwise. Second, while the agent’s behavior in standard FSCs actually explain that he performed the relevant action, the agent’s behavior in FSCs including omission actually fails to explain why the agent did not perform the relevant action. Beyond Swenson’s argument, I end up discussing what factors ultimately explain (and justify) our intuitions about FSCs involving omissions.
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Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) in Affective Sciences financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation [n8 51NF40-104897] and hosted by the University of Geneva. Florian Cova benefited from additional funding from the Cogito Foundation (Project S-131/13, “Towards an experimental philosophy of aesthetics”).
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Cases used for section 4’s study
Omission—John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort.
Due to his laziness, John decides (without deliberating much) not to attempt to rescue the child. As a result, the child dies from drowning.
Sharks—John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort.
Due to his laziness, John decides (without deliberating much) not to attempt to rescue the child. As a result, the child dies from drowning.
Unbeknownst to John, there is a school of sharks hidden beneath the water. If John had attempted to rescue the child, the sharks would have eaten him and his rescue attempt would have been unsuccessful.
Penned-in Sharks—John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort.
Due to his laziness, John decides (without deliberating much) not to attempt to rescue the child. As a result, the child dies from drowning.
Unbeknownst to John, there is an evil observer who wishes for the child to drown. If John had jumped into the water, the evil observer would have released a school of sharks, and as a result, the sharks would have prevented John from rescuing the child. However, since John has not even tried to save the child, he did not have to release the sharks.
Sloth—John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort.
Due to his laziness, John decides (without deliberating much) not to attempt to rescue the child. As a result, the child dies from drowning.
Unbeknownst to John, there is an evil observer who wishes for the child to drown and is monitoring John’s thoughts, thanks to a machine he previously implanted in John’s brain. If John had seriously considered attempting to rescue the child, the evil observer would have caused him to experience an irresistible urge to refrain from saving the child. However, since John has not even considered trying to save the child, he did not have to trigger such an urge.
Hero—John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort.
John decides (without deliberating much) to rescue the child, and he successfully does so. As a result, the child is saved.
Unbeknownst to John, there is a benevolent observer who wishes for the child to be saved and is monitoring John’s thoughts, thanks to a machine he previously implanted in John’s brain. If John had seriously considered attempting to rescue the child, the evil observer would have caused him to experience an irresistible urge to rescue the child. However, since John has not even considered letting the child drown, he did not have to trigger such an urge.
Normal Hero—John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John believes that he could rescue the child without much effort.
John decides (without deliberating much) to rescue the child, and he successfully does so. As a result, the child is saved.
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Cova, F. Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Explanation Condition for Moral Responsibility: a Reply to Swenson. Acta Anal 32, 427–446 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0316-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-017-0316-5