More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang
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Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang (2012) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, we use an important yet overlooked distinction between truthmakers and determiners to help drive this point home.
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- More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang
Volume 27, Issue 3 , pp 335-344
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- The direct argument
- Frankfurt-style counterexamples
- Moral responsibility
- Source incompatibilism
- Author Affiliations
- 2. Department of Philosophy and Humanities, University of Texas at Arlington, 305 Carlisle Hall, Box 19527, Arlington, TX, 76019, USA
- 1. Politics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, Washington State University, PO Box 644880, Pullman, WA, 99164-4880, USA