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More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang

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Abstract

Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang (2012) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, we use an important yet overlooked distinction between truthmakers and determiners to help drive this point home.

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Notes

  1. For instance, Campbell gets Stump (1990; 1996) wrong. Stump does not endorse DSI.

  2. As in Campbell (2006), we assume a causalist theory of action.

  3. See Armstrong 2004, 21.

  4. See Armstrong 2004, p. 21.

  5. See Lewis 1973, 4-18.

  6. While the standard accounts of subjunctives accept this entailment, it has been denied in Gunderson 2002, 2003, 2004; Lycan 1993, 2001; McDermott 2007; and McGee 1985, 2000.

  7. We remain neutral on whether the best versions of FSCs rely upon variably strict conditionals. Mele and Robb (1998) have been convinced by Widerker (1995a, 1995b) that variably strict conditionals are too weak to support FSCs. Instead, they construct a version of FSCs that relies upon strict implication. Yet, regardless of whether FSCs rely upon variably strict conditionals or strict conditionals, DSI is deeply problematic. With two modifications the argument in the last two paragraphs will show that DSI cannot be supported by these versions of FSCs. First, replace 10* with 10** NRS (~C1 → C2) &  (C1 → ~C2)]. Second, replace C2M with N2T: if a proposition is necessarily true then that proposition is true. In fact, since N2T is significantly less debatable than C2M, it ought to be significantly more obvious that these versions of FSCs will cause deep tension for DSI.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Politics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, Washington State University, PO Box 644880, Pullman, WA, 99164-4880, USA

    Joe Campbell

  2. Department of Philosophy and Humanities, University of Texas at Arlington, 305 Carlisle Hall, Box 19527, Arlington, TX, 76019, USA

    Charles Hermes

Authors
  1. Charles Hermes
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  2. Joe Campbell
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Correspondence to Joe Campbell.

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Hermes, C., Campbell, J. More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang. Acta Anal 27, 335–344 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0149-1

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