More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang
First Online: 08 March 2012 Received: 09 September 2011 Accepted: 18 January 2012 DOI:
10.1007/s12136-012-0149-1 Cite this article as: Hermes, C. & Campbell, J. Acta Anal (2012) 27: 335. doi:10.1007/s12136-012-0149-1 Abstract
Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang (
) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2012 ). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, we use an important yet overlooked distinction between 2006 truthmakers and determiners to help drive this point home. Keywords The direct argument Frankfurt-style counterexamples Moral responsibility Source incompatibilism Truthmakers References
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