Acta Analytica

, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 367–385

Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality

Authors

    • Penn State University—New Kensington
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s12136-010-0113-x

Cite this article as:
Bruckner, D.W. Acta Anal (2011) 26: 367. doi:10.1007/s12136-010-0113-x
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Abstract

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent’s preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent’s object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration.

Keywords

Second-order preferencesPreferencesInstrumental rationalityRichard Jeffrey

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010