Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality
- Donald W. Bruckner
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A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent’s preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent’s object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration.
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- Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality
Volume 26, Issue 4 , pp 367-385
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Second-order preferences
- Instrumental rationality
- Richard Jeffrey
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Penn State University—New Kensington, 3550 Seventh Street Road, New Kensington, PA, 15068, USA