Abstract
A belief is reflectively lucky if it is a matter of luck that the belief is true, given what a subject is aware of on reflection alone. Various epistemologists have argued that any adequate theory of knowledge should eliminate reflective luck, but doing so has proven difficult. This article distinguishes between two kinds of reflective luck arguments in the literature: local arguments and global arguments. It argues that local arguments are best interpreted as demanding, not that one be reflectively aware of the reliability of the sources of one’s beliefs, but that one’s beliefs be attributable to one as one’s own. The article then argues that global arguments make illegitimate demands, because they require that we be ultimately answerable for our beliefs. In the end, the article argues that epistemologists should shift their focus away from reflective luck and toward the conditions under which beliefs are attributable to cognitive agents.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For this kind of definition of luck, see Greco (2006: 15). Duncan Pritchard has criticized this definition of luck and has offered his own modal definition of luck. According to Pritchard (2005a), something is a matter of luck if it is such that, although it occurs in the actual world, it does not occur in most (or nearly most or perhaps all) nearby possible worlds. I’m not convinced that this is a helpful definition of luck, however. For a critical assessment of Prichard’s account, see Lackey (2006). The debate over the nature of luck and epistemic luck, in particular, has convinced me that it is a mistake to search for the necessary and sufficient conditions under which an event counts as lucky, but I cannot argue for that claim here.
For simplicity, in this article whenever I refer to a theory as ‘externalist,’ I will mean that it is ‘purely externalist.’ A purely externalist theory avoids internalist constraints on knowledge and justification altogether.
Bergmann (2006).
I follow Bergmann’s (2006) terminology here.
John Greco has most forcefully advocated this approach in a series of papers.
Notice that I am presenting a necessary condition for subjective justification. I am allowing that belief ownership might not be sufficient for subjective justification. For instance, a complete account of subjective justification might well include a no-doxastic-defeater condition, as well.
This might make for a surprising asymmetry thesis, somewhat like the one Susan Wolf (1990) offers in her discussion of moral responsibility. On her view, we can praise someone who could not have done otherwise, if they choose the Good, but we cannot blame anyone who could not have done otherwise, if they reject the Good. My view here is different, of course, because my asymmetry goes in the other direction: I want to say that we can negatively evaluate a belief that does not arise from the exercise of agency. But notice that I’m not saying that we negatively evaluate the agent, and this is because in such cases the agent is not an apt candidate for evaluation, since her beliefs arise from subpersonal mechanisms. One might now raise an objection to my previous analogy between beliefs and blinks, since I am now clarifying that I think beliefs that do not arise from the exercise of agency can be negatively evaluated. But surely, one might think, this is not the case for blinks. Consider a staring contest, however. In such cases, we do negatively evaluate blinks, even though we do not think they arise from the exercise of one’s agency. But also notice that in such cases we do not blame the loser for blinking. So it seems that blinks and beliefs are relevantly analogous.
This model was first outlined in Breyer and Greco (2008).
As Fischer and Ravizza put it, ‘This process may involve conscious and deliberate reflection, but it need not. Just as a person who acts for a reason need not explicitly formulate the reason or consciously invoke it as an action guide, so a person can take responsibility in an implicit, nondeliberative way. […] In this process there need not be any conscious or explicit reflection about the content of the conditions we have specified for moral responsibility; and certainly there need not be any kind of ‘metaphysical’ or philosophical reflection about these matters’ (1998: 214; authors’ italics).
The phrase ‘base one’s beliefs on appropriate grounds’ can be cashed out in different ways by different theories of epistemic justification, but an externalist who is also a reliabilist (for instance) will likely cash it out in terms of reliable faculties.
Of course, the argument applies to all of our belief forming practices, not just sense perception.
For a detailed discussion of this claim, see Bergmann (2006: Chap 8). This paragraph is indebted to Bergmann’s insightful discussion.
It is interesting to note, at this point, that John Greco (2006) responds to this concern about ultimate cognitive responsibility (in part) by denying that it is plausible to demand ultimate ownership (2006: 26). In effect, Greco addresses the problem of local reflective luck, even though his target is the problem of global reflective luck, because he thinks that constitutive luck—the kind of luck that contributes to making us who we are morally and cognitively—is unproblematic.
I want to thank an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
I want to thank audiences at the Bled Philosophy Conference and Illinois State University for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I especially want to thank John Greco, Todd Stewart and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments, all of which improved the article. I also want to thank Lauren Breyer for her support, without which I could not have completed this project.
References
Alston (1989). A “Doxastic Practice” approach to epistemology. In M. Clay & K. Lehrer (Eds.), Knowledge and skepticism. Boulder: Westview Press.
Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without awareness: A defense of epistemic externalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Breyer, D., & Greco, J. (2008). Cognitive integration and the ownership of belief: Response to Bernecker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76, 173–184.
Chisholm, R. (1973). The problem of the criterion. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Fischer, J. (2006). The free will revolution (Continued). The Journal of Ethics, 10, 315–345.
Fischer, J., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control. Cambridge University Press.
Fumerton, R. (1990). Metaepistemology and skepticism. In M. D. Roth & G. Ross (Eds.), Doubting: Contemporary perspectives on skepticism (pp. 57–68). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Fumerton, R. (2006). Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Greco, J. (2004). How to preserve your virtue while losing your perspective. In J. Greco (Ed.), Ernest Sosa and his critics (pp. 96–105). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Greco, J. (2005). Justification is not internal. In Steup and Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 257–70). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Greco, J. (2006). Virtue, luck and the Pyrrhonian problematic. Philosophical Studies, 130(2006), 9–34.
Ishi, H. (2009). Incompatibilism’s allure. Broadview Press.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2005). A contemporary introduction to free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey, J. (2006). Critical study: Prichard’s epistemic luck. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56, 284–289.
Lehrer, K. (2000). Theory of knowledge (2nd ed.). Boulder: Westview Press.
Lewicki, P., Hill, T., & Czyzewska, M. (1992). Nonconscious acquisition of information. American Psychologist, 47, 796–801.
Logothetis, N. (2006). Vision: a window into consciousness. Scientific American Special Edition, 16, 4–11.
McKenna, M. (2008). Ultimacy and Sweet Jane. In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (Eds.), Essays on moral responsibility (pp. 186–208), Cambridge Scholars Press.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005a). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005b). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83, 185–205.
Sosa, E. (1994). Virtue perspectivism: A response to Foley and Fumerton. Philosophical Issues, 5, 29–50.
Sosa, E. (1996). Philosophical skepticism and epistemic circularity. In P. Moser (Ed.), Empirical knowledge (2nd ed., pp. 303–329). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Sosa, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. The Journal of Philosophy, 96, 410–430.
Strawson, G. (1994). The impossibility of moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 75, 5–24.
Stroud, B. (1994). Scepticism, ‘externalism’, and the goal of epistemology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 68, 290–307.
Van Cleve, J. (1984). Reliability, justification, and the problem of induction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, 555–567.
Watson, G. (2004). Agency and answerability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Breyer, D. Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership. Acta Anal 25, 133–154 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0087-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0087-8