Expressivism about Knowledge and the Value of Knowledge
First Online: 15 December 2009 Received: 15 October 2009 Accepted: 24 November 2009 DOI:
Cite this article as: Kappel, K. Acta Anal (2010) 25: 175. doi:10.1007/s12136-009-0073-1 Abstract
The aim of the paper is to state a version of epistemic expressivism regarding knowledge, and to suggest how this expressivism about knowledge explains the value of knowledge. The paper considers how an account of the value of knowledge based on expressivism about knowledge responds to the Meno Problem, the Swamping Problem, and a variety of other questions that pertains to the value of knowledge, and the role of knowledge in our cognitive ecology.
Keywords Value of knowledge Epistemic expressivism The Meno Problem The swamping problem The value problem Inquiry References
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