Abstract
It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
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Searle, J. R. (1990). Consciousness, unconsciousness and intentionality. In C. A. Anderson & J. Owens (Eds.), Propositional attitudes: The role of content in logic, language, and mind (pp. 270–284). Stanford: CSLI.
Searle, J. R. (1992). The rediscovery of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
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This paper is a descendant of a paper presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel in August 2004. I would like to thank the reviewer of this journal for his/her helpful comments on a previous draft.
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Barz, W. Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness?. Acta Anal 22, 183–188 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-007-0007-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-007-0007-8