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Contextualism and conceptual disambiguation

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Abstract

I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.

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Steup, M. Contextualism and conceptual disambiguation. Acta Anal 20, 3–15 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1000-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1000-8

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